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South Africa consists of one of the most diverse societies in the world, comprising of people 
from different cultures, race, religion, gender and languages. During the apartheid era, unjust 
laws were applied to create disadvantages amongst races and gender. Women as well as people 
from the African, Coloured and Indian races were subjected to exclusions from amenities of 
life, education and labour arenas under the apartheid regime. With the emergence of 
democracy, the acknowledgement of the injustices perpetuated against these classes of people 
and the quest to achieve an egalitarian society, the need for restorative measures developed, in 
order to redress the disadvantages that those classes of people endured.  
 
The South African constitution and other legislation provides for the implementation of 
affirmative action measures in order to protect and advance persons who have been 
disadvantaged by the unjust laws. However the application of affirmative action measures have 
often been done in an arbitrary manner, with irrational equity plans, resulting in numerous 
challenges to the implementation of affirmative action measures, eroding the statutory 
protections and benefits of certain designated groups thereby creating disillusionment among 
those groups. 
 
This thesis was prompted by the numerous challenges to the implementation of affirmative 
action measures. It analyses the aims and objectives of affirmative action measures, the various 
legislative provisions as well as the approach by the courts. This thesis also examines the 
various issues pertinent to the implementation of affirmative action measures, such as the right 
to equality, equality of persons from the designated group, dignity, employment equity plans, 
quotas, absolute barriers and targets, and identifies possible solutions to the problem of 
implementation. This thesis also examines the recent CC case of South African Police Service 
v Solidarity obo Barnard, which identifies and analyses virtually every issue pertaining to 
affirmative action measures. 
 
This thesis also provides clarity concerning the factors that should be considered when drafting 
the employment equity plan in order to ensure that the plan is not haphazardly drawn. It 
concludes with recommendations on the implementation of the employment equity plan to 
ensure that the plan is not arbitrarily or capriciously applied, thereby ensuring firstly, that the 
measure is fairly applied and secondly, that those adversely affected would understand and 
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1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1.  THE RESEARCH TOPIC 
 
HAS AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BECOME AN ILLUSIONARY RIGHT FOR 
CERTAIN DESIGNATED GROUPS? 
 
 
1.2.  THE INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
With the emergence of a democratic state in South Africa, the need existed to address 
the historical legal inequalities that existed. South African history has been premised on 
unfair discriminatory and racial laws which discriminated against certain racial groups, 
in particular, in the social, educational and labour fields.  The majority was severely 
prejudiced with limited access to education and job reservation, thereby creating a 
society that was disenfranchised and severely disadvantaged. Affirmative action 
measures have been designed to remedy the historical inequalities and create a society 
where everybody is treated equally and fairly. 
 
The South African Constitution1 and the Bill of Rights2 includes measures to eradicate 
the effects of the past unfair discrimination and to protect and promote those persons or 
categories of persons who were victims of the past system. The legislative instrument 
                                                            
1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
2 Chapter 2 of the Constitution of South Africa. 
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employed to redress imbalances and facilitate change in access and advancement in the 
workplace is affirmative action.  
 
Although legislation prohibits the implementation of quota systems3, numerical targets 
and quota systems have become the norm for implementing affirmative action.  
 
 
1.3.  THE STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to consider whether the current implementation of 
affirmative action measures have created a misconception of the aims and objects of the 
measures resulting in an illusory right for certain designated groups.  
 
 
1.4. THE PROBLEM TO BE ANALYSED  
 
The Constitution4 provides that everyone is equal before the law and has the right to 
equal protection and benefits of the law.5   
 
                                                            
3 Section 15 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
4 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
5 Sect 9 (2) of the Constitution  
3 
 
It also provides for affirmative action “measures designed to protect or advance persons 
or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.”6 
 
The Employment Equity Act (EEA)7 also provides for affirmative action measures8 to 
be implemented in order to achieve equity for persons from designated groups9 as well 
as the implementation of an employment equity plan (EEP).10  
 
However the application of affirmative action measures have often been done in an 
arbitrary manner, with irrational equity plans and demographic figures resulting in 




1.5.  THE AIMS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
This paper will examine the historical background upon which affirmative action 
measures have been determined in South Africa, its comparison with other international 
jurisprudence such as America and India, the current implementation of affirmative 
action measures by designated employers, it's proper application and effect on designated 
groups and whether the affirmative action measures in its present form seek to achieve 
the purpose for which it was designed. 
                                                            
6 Sect 9 (2) of the Constitution 
7 Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998  
8 Sect 15 of the EEA 55 of 1998  
9 Section 13 of the EEA 55 of 1988 




This paper examines the affirmative action measures of foreign jurisdictions, its 
implementation and the challenges that it faced. It will also analyse the courts approach 
in determining how competing interests have been addressed and whether the measures 
have succeeded in achieving its primary objectives. A comparison will be drawn with 
our current affirmative action measures. 
 
This article will also examine how the implementation of affirmative action measures 
affect the constitutional rights of persons from non-designated groups and whether the 
current affirmative action measures serve the primary objectives for which it was 
designed. It will look at the methods, tests or standards that have been employed in an 
attempt to achieve equitable representation. 
 
The current challenges facing the designated and non-designated groups will be 
analysed. An analysis of various court decisions will be undertaken to determine the 
courts approach in dealing with competing interests.  
 
The factors that should be taken into account in drawing a rational equity plan will be 
considered, in particular whether national demographic figures should apply to local or 
regional areas. 
 
Finally this paper will seek to illustrate the factors that should be taken into account in 







1.6.  THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The methodology employed in this research is desktop research which would include the 
review of materials that are available in the public domain such as legislation, published 
works, case law, journal articles, newspapers, websites, magazines, public reports, public 
statements, published reviews, literature reviews, collective reviews and “archived 
materials that are available in the public domain.”11 
 
 
1.7.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
1.7.1.   What is affirmative action? 
1.7.2.   What are the primary objectives of affirmative action measures? 
1.7.3.   What is the court’s interpretation of the purpose of affirmative action? 
1.7.4.   What is meant by equitable representation? 
1.7.5. What has equitable representation in general been interpreted to mean? 
1.7.6. What methods or tests or standards have been employed in an attempt to 
achieve equitable representation? 
1.7.7. Has the practice of numerical targets created a perverse competition within 
the designated groups on the basis of their race? 
1.7.8.   What are the courts’ approach to these standards, tests or methods? 
1.7.9.   What are the criticisms/supports for these methods, tests or standards? 
1.7.10.   What are the standards that should be employed to acquire equitable  
 representation? 
                                                            
11 UKZN Exemption from Ethics Review Application Form: 2014. 
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1.7.11.   Do the current affirmative action measures serve the primary objectives for  
which it was designed? 
1.7.12.   How do the implementation of affirmative action measures affect the 
 constitutional rights of persons from the non-designated groups? 
1.7.13.   What are the current challenges facing the designated and non-designated  
groupings? 
1.7.14.   How should competing interest be approached? 
1.7.15.   What are the courts approach to how competing interests should be 
 addressed? 
1.7.16.   How can a coherent and consistent guideline in the understanding,  
observance and implementation of affirmative action measures be achieved? 
1.7.17.   What are the factors that should be taken into account when drawing a 
 rational equity plan? 
1.7.18.   Should national demographic figures apply to local/regional areas? 
1.7.19.   What factors should be taken into account in ensuring that there is a fair,  
reasonable and rational application of affirmative action measures? 
 
 
1.8.   CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This study is underpinned by the doctrine of proportionality. This theory, best captured 
by the provisions of section 36 of the Constitution,12 illustrates that the means selected 
                                                            
12 Supra note1. 
7 
 
to achieve a purpose, must be able to achieve the purpose it was desired to achieve. 
Preference should be given to the means which has the least adverse effect. This study 
dispels the judicial deference principle which postulates that decisions which were left 
to policy makers should be beyond judicial scrutiny. It is imperative that there be 
accountability in every matter that affects members of the public hence no subject should 
be left to the exclusive discretion of politicians. Once policy is embodied in a statute it 
is a natural consequence that administrative and judicial regulation follow. 
 
 
1.9. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Employment Equity plans were borne out of the need to facilitate the reflection of 
diversity in the workplace which represents the South African society within the confines 
of the constitutional precinct. Scholars have written and explained the principles which 
underpin the Constitution13; chief among them, being equality. Scholars have also gone 
to the extent of explaining what the EEA provides as the way to implement equity plans. 
What follows is a review of their submissions in order to demonstrate an understanding 
of their submissions as well as identify areas they might have overlooked or areas that 
need further consideration.  
 
Fredman,14 defines the imports of the principle of equality. It is her understanding that 
from this principle of substantive equality (which is preferred over formal equality) 
emanates the duty to provide so as to alleviate disadvantage that is evident in society. 
Because this duty is upon the state, she argues that the judiciary can augment this role 
                                                            
13 Supra note1. 




by being the referee of the ways set out to achieve equality.15 Her assessment is achieved 
through an analysis of jurisprudence on equality. 
 
The two known objectives of substantive equality are: equality of opportunity and 
equality of results.16 Equal opportunity would entail removing obstacles that stop an 
individual from getting hired, for example nepotism. However, this is not sufficient 
because some people are at a disadvantage which was created in the past, hence there is 
need for the state to aid those who were put at a disadvantage to be able to compete with 
the rest of the people. Fredman’s argument can be summed up as a campaign against 
social exclusion. 
 
Of significant importance from Fredman’s work is her insistence on democratic 
accountability. “This entails an explanation of the decision which is reasonable and 
proportionate and is based on evidence rather than generalizations or judicial notice.”17 
Fredman, acknowledges that society operates in a system of perpetual scarcity of 
resources. This then necessitates the state to develop a criteria of distribution which may 
require that certain persons be prioritized.18 In the employment field this argument finds 
expression in affirmative action and the insistence on a pre-determined plan. She then 
closes by stating that this prioritization should be checked by democratic principles and 
not merely left to those in power to dictate. However, the author’s contribution is 
oriented in the inclination of social political rights. This study then directs the author’s 
arguments to the workplace law and seeks to demonstrate how the same principles can 
be applied to the concept of affirmative action. 
 
Solomon19 narrates the provisions of affirmative action in the EEA. He states that the 
prioritization of the designated group cannot be challenged as discriminatory until 
                                                            
15 Pg 189. 
16 Pg 167. 
17 Pg 190. 
18 Pg 168. 
19 M Solomon “Regulation Of Affirmative Action By The EEA  55 Of 1998” (1999) 11 SAMLJ ,pg 1425 
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members of the designated group have been placed on a level at which they can 
competently compete with members of the non-designated groups.20 He holds that “it is 
not so much about positive discrimination against those who have been previously 
advantaged, but about the positive upliftment of disadvantaged people thereby levelling 
the playing field in the workplace”.21 He goes on to hold that: 
 
“Since affirmative action is a positive measure and is therefore firmly rooted in 
legislative policy, there is little room for judicial pronouncement on the means 
used to achieve equality. Judicial deference to the legislative branch of 
government is thus the rule rather than the exception.”22 
 
The article does not reflect and review the principles that are relied upon to come to this 
conclusion. One would expect an analysis on the concept of rationality in order to 
determine whether it is a sufficient standard of assessing affirmative action. Although it 
is now settled that affirmative action is not unfair discrimination, one would expect that 
there be principles regulating the decision. The author does not address the possibility 
of the arbitrary drafting and implementation of equity plans. This omission is addressed 
in this study below. 
 
Ryroft23 assesses “the role of the judiciary and arbitrators in interpreting and 
implementing affirmative action policies”.24 He attempts to find a possible way to strike 
a balance between the contending individual rights and broader societal goal. 
 
                                                            
20 Pg 234. 
21 Pg 235. 
22 Pg 238. 
23 Rycroft “Obstacles to Employment Equity?: The Role of Judges and Arbitrators in the Interpretation and 
Implementation of Affirmative Action Policies” 1999 ILJ 1411 1423.. 
24 Pg 1412. 
10 
 
He notes that “the target in the EEA is not explicitly the concept of disadvantage but 
designated groups”.25 This is further supported by his allusion to the fact that the 
majority of applicants in affirmative action disputes are whites and adjudicators have 
decided such disputes with a preoccupation of protection of this group. 
 
It is clear from the writing of the article that it was written before the case of Barnard26. 
The article still treats affirmative action as a suspect policy.27 This is evident from the 
comparison with the American affirmative action as well as the emphasis of the narrow 
tailoring.28 Furthermore, the author emphasizes the prominence of individual 
disadvantage over the broader spectrum.29  The article closes by saying the EEA will be 
clear as the jurisprudence develops. This study will bring forth an updated analysis of 










                                                            
25 Pg 1413. 
26 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard and Others [2014] ZACC 23. 






2.  CHAPTER 2: DEFINITIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
 
2.1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This entire thesis is based on affirmative action. It is therefore imperative that we 
understand the concept of affirmative action and the principles that underpin it. This 
chapter sets out to define affirmative action and its objectives. In so doing, reference is 
also made to international jurisprudence such as the United States and India in order to 
gain a better understanding of the concept. 
 
 
2.2.   DEFINITION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION  
 
Affirmative action or positive discrimination (known as employment equity in Canada, 
‘job reservation’ in India and Nepal and ‘positive action’ in the UK) is a policy of 
favouring members of a disadvantaged group who are perceived to suffer from 
discrimination within a culture.30 What is clear from the various definitions is that behind 
every affirmative action policy, there is a history of persons or groups who are or have 
been previously disadvantaged. 
 
 
                                                            
30 The Free Dictionary. Retrieved 13 February 2014. ‘(Sociology) the provision of special opportunities in 
employment, training except for a disadvantaged group, such as women, ethnic minorities, etc. US 






Affirmative action measures were first used in the United States in 1961 to promote 
actions that achieve non-discrimination. It was intended to promote opportunities for 
defined minority groups within a society in order to give them equal access to that of the 
privileged majority population.31 The history of affirmative action in the United States 
is one of a political struggle over the meaning of discrimination and methods of dealing 
with it.32 It was implemented in an attempt to achieve equality among racial groups 
(primarily in favour of the black minority group) after a long history of slavery and 
discrimination.33 
 
In the USA context, affirmative action refers to a “broad array of race, ethnicity 
programs, enacted by the government and private sector, voluntarily or by court order, 
to promote equality of opportunity and racial diversity”.34 The programs are meant to 
remedy the impact of historically unfair treatment. The Olivier Report35 states that 





                                                            
31 Supra at note 12.  
32 Nicholas Smith Affirmative Action: Its Origin and Point 1992 SAJHR 234. 
33 Kende Constitutional Rights in Two Worlds: South Africa and the United States (Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 2009) at 174.  
34 LR Langston “Affirmmative Action, a look at South Africa and the United States: a question of 
pigmentation or leveling the playing field?” Vol 13 1997 American University International Law Review 
334. 
35 South African Law Commission Working Paper 25 Project 58 (1989) art 2 and South African Law  






In the Indian context affirmative action is referred to as special provision for reservations 
of positions.36 The policy is provided for in the Indian Constitution and makes provision 
for quotas in electoral constituencies and governmental posts, among others.37 In 
furtherance of the policy’s objective, the policy makes it permissible to relax entry 
requirements for certain reserved job reservations and designated groups.38 The Indian 
community is divided on the basis of castes, tribes, religion, language and culture, some 
of which suffered greatly from discrimination.39 
 
Article 14 of the Indian Constitution provides that “the state shall not deny to any person 
equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India,” 
and Article 15(1) provides that the “State shall not discriminate against any citizen on 
the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them”. Article 15(4) 
permits “any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally 
backward classes of citizens. …” Article 16 and article 29 of the Indian Constitution 
makes provision for the reservation of positions for the advancement of socially and 
educationally backward classes of persons belonging to the ‘Scheduled Castes’ and the 
‘Scheduled Tribes’. The primary objective of this ‘reservation system’, which is 
essentially a form of a quota system, is to promote the opportunities for improved social 
and educational status of underprivileged communities. It provides opportunities for the 
members of the ‘Scheduled Castes’ and ‘Scheduled Tribes’ to increase their political 
representation and provides opportunities in the labour force, educational institutions, 
and other public institutions.40 
 
                                                            
36 O Dupper and C Garbers (Eds) Equality in the Work Place: Reflections from South Africa and Beyond 
2009 287. 
37 Ibid; art 15(4) of the Indian Constitution of 1949. 
38 Ibid. 
39 They have been referred to as the depressed or backward classes.  
40 Basu, Durga Dass Introduction to the Constitution of India (2008) LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa P98. 
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Whilst it has been acknowledged that the 'reservation system' in India has achieved its 
basic objective, many argue that the reservation/quota system causes resentment 
amongst its citizens and creates greater discord in an already divided country.41 Much of 
the provisions for equality and restorative measures in the Indian Constitution resemble 
that of the South African Constitution.42 Like the South African Constitution, the Indian 
Constitution provides for anti-discrimination as well as for a pro-active role for the state 




The 1963 Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia affords special protection to 
‘Aboriginal People’ and Malays. This protection includes the reservation of positions of 
public servants, scholarships and educational facilities for those groups, and the 
preferential granting of business licences. The measures in the Malaysian Constitution 
favour members of the majority population.43 
 
OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN JURISPRUDENCE 
 
Whereas affirmative action measures in the United States were designed to protect and 
promote the interests of minorities against a privileged majority within its society; in 
Malaysia, the affirmative action measures were designed to promote and favour 
members of the majority population. It follows therefore, that a general justification for 
affirmative action cannot be given as there is no uniform practice to justify it.44  
 
However, what is common is that affirmative action are measures, policies or procedures 
that are implemented to protect and/or promote persons or categories of persons who are 
disadvantaged or have been disadvantaged. 
                                                            
41 Twisha the Economist Jul 2nd 2013, 09.23 www.economist.com/bligs/banyan/2013/06/affirmative-action 
accessed 15/10/14 at 11.59pm. 
42 Except that quotas are not permitted in the South African Constitution. 
43 Nicholas Smith, Affirmative Action: Its Origin and Point 1992 SAJHR 234. 




2.3.  THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
 
South Africa consists of one of the most diverse societies in the world. It comprises of 
people from different cultures, race, religion, gender and languages to mention a few. 
During the apartheid era unjust laws were applied to create disadvantages amongst races 
and gender. Women as well as people from the African, Coloured and Indian races were 
subjected to exclusions from amenities of life, education and labour arenas under the 
apartheid regime. The South African constitutional democracy was founded on defined 
values of “human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human 
rights and freedoms.”45 However, unlike other constitutions, the acknowledgement of 
the injustices perpetuated against certain classes of people necessitated that restorative 




2.4.  THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
One of the primary objects of the South African Constitution is “the achievement of 
equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.”47 The Constitution also 
provides for affirmative action measures in the following terms: 
 
“Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To 
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to 
protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination may be taken.”48 
  
                                                            
45 Section 1 (a) of the South African Constitution; South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard and 
Others [2014] ZACC 23 at Para 28. 
46 Section 9 (2) of the South African Constitution. 
47 Section 1 (a) of the Constitution. 
48 Section 9 (2) of the Constitution. 
16 
 
As indicated earlier under the definition of affirmative action in the Indian context, the 
South African Constitution allows pro-active measures to be taken in a bid to achieve 
equality amongst social groups. Clearly affirmative action measures must favour 
persons or a group of persons who have been victims of the past discriminatory laws.  
 
The Constitution provides for the preservation of equality and prevention of unfair 
discrimination.49 Because of this provision, there have been many challenges to the 
interpretation and application of affirmative action measures. Courts are required to 
draw a balance between these competing provisions. In the leading case of Minister of 
Finance and Another v Van Heerden50, the court held that in order to determine whether 
the affirmative action measure falls within the ambit of section 9 (2) of the Constitution, 
the enquiry is threefold: 
 
“The first yardstick relates to whether the measure targets persons or categories 
of persons will have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination; the second is 
whether the measure is designed to protect or advance such persons or categories 
of persons; and the third requirement is whether the measure promotes the 
achievement of equality.”51 
 
From this judgement it has been established that affirmative action constitutes a valid 
defence against a claim of unfair discrimination. Of note to this study, is the provision 
that the beneficiaries of affirmative action measures must be persons or categories of 
persons who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. As shall be discussed 
later in this study, the legislature put a general assumption that everyone who fall under 
the groups that were oppressed under apartheid is in need of affirmation. Whether the 
court’s interpretation has followed this reasoning is a question that puzzles many and 
shall be answered in the rest of this study. 
 
The EEA was enacted to give effect to the constitutional provision for affirmative action. 
The Act recognizes that as a result of apartheid and other discriminatory laws and 
                                                            
49 Section 9 (1) and (2) of the South African Constitution. 
50 2004 11 BCLR 1125 (CC), 2004 6 SA 121 (CC). 
51 Ibid at paragraph 37. 
17 
 
practices, there are disparities in employment, occupation and income within the national 
labour market, and that those disparities create such pronounced advantages for certain 
categories of people that they cannot be redressed simply by repealing discriminatory 
laws. The primary legislative provisions relating to the implementation of affirmative 
action in the workplace are contained in sections 6, 13 to 20 and 42 of the EEA which 
were enacted to give effect to section 9 of the Constitution which must be read with 
section 23(1) of the Constitution and section 186(2) of the Labour Relations Act 
(LRA).52  
 
Section 6 of the EEA provides that: “no person may unfairly discriminate, directly or 
indirectly, against an employee, in any employment policy or practice, on one or more 
grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility, 
ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status, 
conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language and birth.” On the other hand it is 
provided under section 6(2) that “it is not unfair discrimination to take affirmative action 
measures consistent with the purpose of this Act; or distinguish, exclude or prefer any 
person on the basis of an inherent requirement of a job.” It is quite clear that section 6 
resembles section 9 of the Constitution by proscribing discrimination on arbitrary 
grounds and at the same time putting a disclaimer when such discrimination is done on 
the basis of affirmative action. 
  
 The EEA provides for affirmative action measures in the following terms: 
 
             “(1)  Affirmative action measures are measures designed to ensure that       
suitably qualified people from all designated groups have equal 
employment opportunities and are equally represented in all 
occupational categories and levels in the workforce of a designated 
employer.  
 
(2)  Affirmative action measures implemented by a designated employer  
must include- 
(a)  measures to identify and eliminate employment barriers,     
including unfair discrimination, which adversely affect people 
from designated groups; 
                                                            
52 Act 66 of 1995. 
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(b)  measures designed to further diversity in the workplace based 
on equal dignity and respect of all people;  
(c)   making reasonable accommodation for people from  designated 
groups in order to ensure that they enjoy equal opportunities 
and are equally represented in the workforce of a designated 
employer;  
(d)   subject to subsection (three), measures to –  
    (i)    ensure the equitable representation of suitably qualified               
   people from designated groups in all occupational 
categories and levels in the workforce; and  
  (ii)  retain and develop people from designated groups and to 
implement appropriate training measures, including 
measures in terms of an act of Parliament providing for 
skills development.  
(3)  The measures referred to in subsection (2) (d) include preferential 
treatment and numerical goals, but exclude quotas.  
(4)  Subject to section 42, nothing in this section requires a designated 
employer to take any decision concerning an employment policy 
or practice that would establish an absolute barrier to the 
prospective or continued employment or advancement of people 
who are not from designated groups.”53 
 
This chapter is not intended to deal with the implementation of the provisions of the 
EEA with regards to affirmative action measures, as this aspect will be specially dealt 
with in chapter 3, which follows; however, at this stage it is important to note that 
the EEA “embraces both a formal (equality of treatment) and a substantive (equality 
of outcome or the equality of results) approach equality.”54 
 
 
2.5.  EQUALITY 
 
The right to equality is contained in section 9 of the Constitution whilst in the 
employment sector, this right is given effect by section 6 (2) of the EEA. Section 9 of 
the Constitution provides for both formal equality (section 9 (1) - equality before the 
law) and substantive equality (section 9 (2) - measures to promote equality).  
                                                            
53 Section 15 of the EEA. 





Formal equality is based on merit; it is premised on the assumption that equality can be 
realised by implementing anti-discriminatory laws. Characteristics such as race, colour, 
gender, caste or other analogous status are irrelevant. It is based on the principle that 
individuals should be treated alike and that it would be unlawful to treat a person 
differently or less favourably on the basis of race, colour, gender or other 
status.55Considering the fact that South African history is premised on unjust laws that 
disadvantaged certain groups of people in the educational, social and employment 
environment, formal equality would be inadequate to achieve the equality envisaged in 
the Constitution. Not considering a person's status would entail ignoring the 
disadvantage experienced by individuals who have been victims of the unjust system. 
The consequence would be that the disadvantage would be perpetuated.56 
 
Substantive equality, on the other hand, addresses the limitations of formal equality. It 
is applied in a way that recognises the historical background of society. Under 
substantive equality it is permissible that advantages be afforded to those groups of 
persons who have been previously disadvantaged. The focus of substantive equality is 
the result or outcome of a particular rule; the status of a person is very relevant.57 
Substantive equality embraces the historical background of the society in question, 
permitting that advantages be afforded to those previously excluded. The need for 
positive measures in pursuit of substantive equality have been emphasised in Bato Star 
Fishing v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism58 where the court stated: 
 
“Our Constitution recognises that decades of systematic racial discrimination 
entrenched by the apartheid legal order cannot be eliminated without positive 
action being taken to achieve that result. We are required to do more than that. 
                                                            
55 O Dupper and C Garbers (Eds) Equality in the Workplace: Reflections from South Africa and Beyond 
(2009) 17.  
56 Ibid note 17; Fredman Discrimination Law (2002) 1-37;  
57 Supra, note 25 at 18. 
58 2004 11 BCLR 687 (CC). 
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The effects of discrimination may continue indefinitely unless there is a 
commitment to end it.”59 
 
Discrimination is where a person or group is treated less favourably than another person 
or group or denied privileges or rights accorded others on the basis of an arbitrary ground 
or on the basis of one (or more) of the listed grounds set out in section 6(1). 
Discrimination is a relative concept. It involves a comparative analysis. A complaint of 
less favourable treatment or adverse treatment without relying on different treatment of 
other person/s cannot constitute discrimination. In Harksen v Lane NO and Others,60 
the court set out a three stage enquiry in order to determine whether there was a violation 
of constitutional provisions of equality. The first question of the enquiry is whether there 
has been a differentiation between persons or categories of persons which constituted 
discrimination. The position of the complainants in society will be considered, that is 
whether they were victims of the past unjust laws and whether the discrimination is on 
a specified ground or not. The second leg of the analysis consists of asking whether the 
discrimination is unfair. This entails examining the nature of the provision and the 
purpose sought to be achieved. It must be borne in mind that discrimination in itself is 
not actionable in law; it is only when such discrimination is unfair that a litigant may be 
entitled to relief.61 The third stage is whether the discrimination arises out of a law of 
general application; if it is, it would be justified. If it is proved that the discrimination 
was necessary in order to implement affirmative action measures which are consistent 
with the provisions of the Constitution and the EEA, then the discrimination would not 
be unfair.  
 
Affirmative action is a valid defence against a claim of infringement of section 9.62 The 
court in Van Heerden63 held that such a defence will pass the constitutional muster if it 
                                                            
59 Ibid at paragraphs 74. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Naidoo v Minister of Safety and Security and Another (2013) 5 BLLR 490 (LC) para 112. 
62 Chapter 3 of the EEA. 
63 Ibid note 62. 
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satisfies the following conditions: firstly, the measure must favour persons who have 
been victims of unfair discrimination; secondly, the measure must be designed to protect 
or advance those classes of persons, and thirdly, the measure must promote the 
achievement of equality.64  
 
Moseneke J, went on to say, referring to the affirmative action measures and the 
Constitution, that: 
“Legislative and other measures that properly fall within the requirements of 
section 9 (2) are not presumptively unfair. Remedial measures are not 
derogation from, but a substantive and composite part of, the equality 
protection envisaged by the provisions of section 9 and of the Constitution as 
a whole. Their primary object is to promote the achievement of equality. To 
that end, differentiation aimed at protecting or advancing persons 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination is warranted provided the measures 
are shown to conform to the internal test set by section 9(2). When a measure 
is challenged as violating the equality provision, its defender may meet the 
claim by showing that the measure is contemplated by section 9 (2) in that it 
promotes the achievement of equality and is designed to protect and advance 
persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. It seems to me that to 
determine whether a measure falls within section 9(2) the enquiry is threefold. 
The first yardstick relates to whether a measure targets persons or categories 
of persons who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination; the second 
is whether the measure is designed to protect or advance such persons or 
categories of persons; and the third requirement is whether the measure 
promotes the achievement equality.”65 [underline added] 
 
In summary then, Moseneke held that if the measure properly falls within the ambit 
of section 9(2) it does not constitute discrimination, even if the measure is based on 
any of the grounds of discrimination set out in sections 9(3) and 9(4). When a 
                                                            
64  Minister of Finance and Another v Van Heerden [2004] ZACC 3; 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC); at para 37. 
65 Van Heerden above n 61 at para 32. 
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measure is challenged as violating the equality provision, its defender may meet the 
claim by showing that the measure is contemplated by section 9(2) in that it is 
designed to promote the achievement of equality and advance persons disadvantaged 
by unfair discrimination.  
 
 
2.6.   EQUALITY OF PERSONS FROM THE DESIGNATED GROUP 
 
Affirmative action has been interpreted in a way that has established a hierarchy amongst 
the members of the designated group. This is despite the fact that all the three races have 
been designated as black people and the fair sex has been deemed a designated class 
despite its race. The earliest case to put this on paper was the case of Motala and Another 
vs University of Natal.66 In this case the judge held that it would be to fly in the face of 
South African history to treat all members of the designated groups as if their suffering 
under the apartheid regime was the same. A series of cases have followed in the 
employment sector which have confirmed such an approach.67 
 
 
As much as such an approach is understandable, there is need for caution lest there be a 
perverse competition amongst the designated group members themselves.68 The CC 
warned that:  
 
“We must be careful that the steps taken to promote substantive equality do not 
unwittingly infringe the dignity of other individuals – especially those who were 
themselves previously disadvantaged……… decision that redresses racial 
disadvantage but grossly aggravates gender  disadvantage, for example, might be 
                                                            
66 1995 (3) BCLR 374 (D); Gerhard Koorts v Free State Provincial Adminstration CCMA FS3915 21 May 
1995; McInnes vs Technikon Natal (2000) 21 ILJ 1138 (LC). 
67 Ibid. 
68 Naidoo vs Minister of safety and Security 2013 (7) BLLR 490 (LC)  para 158. 
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impermissible, as might a decision that advances only one disadvantaged racial 
group while limiting the others. ”69 
 
 
Instead of basing an exclusion on elusive grounds such as degree of disadvantage, Darcy 
du Toit propounds that representivity would work better in determining how to allocate 
posts.70  However, as chapter 3 will show that the way representivity has been applied it 
has not been without its own flaws. 
 
Designated employees do not have a right to be affirmed.71 The court in Dudley vs City 
of Cape Town,72 held that an employee aggrieved cannot approach the court on the basis 
that an employer has failed to follow an EEP until all the section 50 enforcement 
procedures have been exhausted. Not only does this argument augur abuse by employers 
of the restorative policy, such an approach frustrates certain members of the designated 






Equality entails upholding the human dignity of all its citizens. It means that society 
cannot accept legislative distinctions that would treat certain people disadvantageously 
or demean them, or ‘offend fundamental human dignity’74. Dignity has been regarded 
by many academics, practitioners and judges as the 'central equality value’.75 
 
                                                            
69 Moseneke J paragrapgh 31 of the Barnard CC Case. 
70 Camron J para 80 Barnard CC case. 
71 Dudley v City of Cape Town & another, [2008] 12 BLLR 1155 (LAC). 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Supra note 24; Law v Canada (1999) 1 SCR 497 (51). 
75 Supra note 24 at p19.  
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The concept of dignity has not been clearly defined. This has been partly so because of 
its ability to fit into the understanding of other rights and that preference is given to 
relatively more specific rights when resolving disputes. The Kantian moral philosophy 
states that dignity is what gives an individual his intrinsic worth.76 Hence the 
Constitution in section 10 demands that everyone has the right to have their dignity 
protected.77 The Constitution goes further from acknowledging the equal worth of 
people to sanctioning pro-active measures for the protection of this right to dignity.78 
The court in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality Vs Minister of Justice 
found that anything that builds insecurity and vulnerability into an individual on the 
basis of an immutable trait, violates that individual’s dignity.79 Although dignity has not 
been clearly defined, one can find understanding of it in the way it informs other rights 
and how it is enforced and protected. It was stated in Munsamy80 that the role of dignity 
as a substantive test should be relevant. 
 
Whilst dignity plays a central role in achieving equality, it does have its complications. 
A claimant in an equality dispute claim would be required to prove not only that he has 
been disadvantaged, but also that the impugned measure signifies a lack of respect for 
him as a person, or has fundamentally impaired his or her rights of dignity or sense of 
equal worth.81 The position has been borne out in the President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Another v Hugo82, where the claimant based his claim on the grounds of 
gender, but could not prove that his rights of dignity were impaired. The claimant 
challenged the pardon issued by President Mandela to all women prisoners who were 
mothers of young children. The pardon was challenged by a male prisoner, the sole carer 
of his young child, on the basis that it discriminated on the grounds of gender. The court 
                                                            
76 I Currie and J De Waal The Bill Of Rights Handbook 6th ed 2013 pg 251. 
77 Ibid at p 252. 
78 National Coalition For Gay And Lesbian Equality Vs Minister Of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6(CC). 
79 Ibid at p 28. 
80 Munsany v Minister of Safety and Security and Ano 2013 (7) BLLR 695 LC. 
81 Ibid at p20. 
82 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC); SACR 1997 (1) 567 (CC).  
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rejected the claim. Judge Goldstone, in the majority judgement found that “The 
Presidential Act might have denied fathers an opportunity it had for the mothers, but it 
could not be said to have fundamentally impaired their rights of dignity or sense of equal 
worth.”83 However Kriegler J, in his dissenting opinion stated: 
 
“One of the ways in which one accords equal dignity and respect for persons is 
by seeking to protect the basic choices they make about their own identities. 
Reliance on the generalisation that women are the primary caregivers is harmful 
in its tendency to cramp and stunt the efforts of both men and women to form the 
identities freely.”84 
  
The difficulties relating to dignity are considerable, however what is important is that 
dignity is an element of equality which relates to basic humanity where individuals 
should not be humiliated or degraded on the grounds of race, gender, disability, age or 
other status-based or socio-economic disadvantage.85 Thus, all people should be treated 
as individuals with worth and value. 
 
One may ask what the link is between affirmative action and the right to dignity. It often 
occurs that the implementation of affirmative action gives the impression of punishing 
certain group members for the atrocities of their forebears.86 To address this grey area, 
the CC held that such a shortcoming should be viewed in light of the policy that the 
affirmative action seeks to achieve.87 The judge cautioned that such justification should 
not totally sacrifice the dignity of members of non-designated groups who are 
considered better off. All restorative measures need to be carried out within the precincts 
of the Constitution.88 
 
                                                            
83 Ibid at 47. 
84 Ibid at 80.  
85 Supra note 24 at page 22; S Fredman Facing the Future: Substantive Equality under the Spotlight (July 
28,2010). 
86 J Grogan “Unequal race From swords to running shoes”; Moseneke ACJ in Barnard’s CC Case para 30; 
VAN DER WESTHUIZEN J in Barnard’s CC case para 126. 




Thus in cases where it appears that individual dignity has been infringed for the benefit 
of a class of persons, such should be scrutinized under the light of the need to remedy 
the imbalances in the present society. 
 
“We are not islands unto ourselves…….. Dignity contains individualistic as well 
as collective impulses. Its collectivist attributes, including that we are “social 
beings whose humanity is expressed through . . . relationships with others”,… 
find resonance in the South African idea of Ubuntu, which foregrounds 
“interdependence of the members of a community.”89 
 
In trying to harmonise these conflicting interests, it has become apparent that some 
values may need to yield to others at a point in time. Thus the court held that:  
 
“In other words, it is not necessarily an injury to dignity to view a person only 
through the lens of one ground listed in section 9(3), provided the reason for doing 
so is to redress historical inequality. But this becomes dissonant if we ascribe 
only one identity at the cost of seeing the multitudes that make up each individual. 
The courts should give deference where decisions are made in a way that balances 
the mandate to achieve representivity with a full appreciation of the individual.”90 
 
This does not mean that restorative measures are beyond judicial scrutiny. The 
implementation of restorative measures shall be scrutinised using rationality and 
fairness as a standard for Constitutional validity.91 This is meant to safe guard the use 







                                                            
89 Paras 186 and 187 of Barnard’s Constitutional case. 
90Barnard’s CC case Paras 117 and 118. 
91 Barnard’s Constitutional Case. 
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2.8. DESIGNATED GROUPS 
 
Clearly the affirmative action measures must favour persons or a group of persons who 
have been victims of the past discriminatory laws. It therefore becomes important at this 
point in time to look at who are the beneficiaries of affirmative action and understand 
the reasoning behind their designation. 
 
Section 9(2) of the Constitution provides that the beneficiaries of affirmative action are 
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. The EEA 
refers to the beneficiaries of affirmative action as the designated group.92 The relevant 
section defines the designated group as black people, women and people with 
disabilities. On the other hand, black people are defined as Africans, Coloureds and 
Indians. Thus the beneficiaries of affirmative action are referred to as the designated 
group. It is noteworthy that the categorization of beneficiaries of affirmative action is 
based on the same classification that was used during apartheid, especially race. 
 
The paragraph above indicates that the Constitution provides that beneficiaries of 
affirmative action are those persons who suffered historical discrimination because it is 
adversely retrogressive and difficult to determine the extent of an individual’s 
disadvantage.93 The EEA makes a blanket assumption that everyone in the designated 
group was disadvantaged. Thus, for example, even an African person who was educated 
up to tertiary level overseas during apartheid remains eligible for affirmative action. 
Both the Constitution and the EEA do not explicitly set out the kind of disadvantage that 
needs to be remedied or that qualifies a person to be deemed disadvantaged by the past. 
Reference is only made to persons who were discriminated in the past. 
 
There has been much debate on the issue of whether affirmative action programmes are 
designed to benefit only those persons who were actually disadvantaged by the past 
                                                            
92 Section 1 of the EEA. 
93 M Solomon “REGULATION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BY THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT  55 of 
1998” (1999) 11 SA Merc LJ ,pg 1425; Rycroft “Obstacles to Employment Equity?: The Role of Judges and 
Arbitrators in the Interpretation and Implementation of Affirmative Action Policies” 1999 ILJ 1411 1423.. 
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unjust discrimination or whether such measures should also include those persons who 
were not actually disadvantaged but belonged to a designated group (a group which 
suffered unfair discrimination).94 In Durban City Council (Electricity Department),95 
“an arbitrator interpreted the terms of the applicable affirmative action policy to require  
that, in order to qualify for preferential treatment, a person must establish that he or she 
is the actual victim of disadvantage.” In this case he found that an Indian applicant failed 
to provide any evidence of exclusion or disadvantage based on race.96 
 
In George v Liberty Life Association of South Africa,97 Landman J, stated that the 
Constitution recognises the fact that even within a disadvantaged racial group “there 
may be and indeed are persons who have had opportunities and who have not been, or 
not be disadvantaged to the extent of their fellows.” In his view affirmative action in a 
South African context is not primarily intended for their benefit.98 
 
However the wording of section 9 (2) of the Constitution makes provision for both 
individual and group based on affirmative action measures. The reference to ‘persons or 
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination’ clearly favours 
individuals themselves who have been disadvantaged, as well as individuals who 
themselves may not have been victims of unfair discrimination, but who belong to a 
category which has been disadvantaged.99In Stoman v Minister of Safety and Security 
and Others,100 Van Der Westhuizen J , held that the emphasis of affirmative action is 
on a group work category of persons who have been disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination. The aim is not to reward individuals but to advance the category of 
                                                            
94 Pretorius JL, Labour Law, Employment Equity Law July 2012 Par 9.3.1. Gibson op cit 308; Sloot Positieve 
discriminatie: Maatschappelijke: Ongelijkheid en Rechtsontwikkeling in de Verenigde Staaten en in 
Nederland (1986) 220. 
95 (1995) 4 ARB 6.9.5 (www.irnetwork.co.za). 
96 Ibid at note 45. 
97 (1996) 8 BLLR 985 (IC). 
98 Ibid at 1005. 
99 Ibid at note 45. 
100 2002 (3) SA 468 at 484C-E. 
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persons to which the individual belongs and to achieve substantive equality in South 
African society. In his view, the aim is not to punish or otherwise prejudice the 
complainant as an individual but to diminish the over-representation which his group 
has been enjoying as a result of previous unfair discrimination.101 
 
Our courts have appreciated the complications that arise in fulfilling the constitutional 
aspiration of achieving equality. In Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Others,102 the court stated that: 
 
“There are profound difficulties that will be confronted in giving effect to the 
constitutional commitment of achieving equality. We must not underestimate 
them. The measures that bring about transformation will inevitably affect some 
members of the society adversely, particularly those coming from the previously 
advantaged communities. It may well be that other considerations may have to 
yield in favour of achieving the goal we fashioned for ourselves in the 
Constitution. What is required, though, is that the process of transformation must 
be carried out in accordance with the Constitution. As was recognised in Bel 
Porto School Governing Body and Others v Premier of the Province, Western 
Cape, and Another:”103 
 
“The difficulties confronting us as a nation in giving effect to these commitments 
are profound and must not be underestimated. The process of transformation must 
be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and its Bill 
of Rights. Yet, in order to achieve the goals set in the Constitution, what has to 
be done in the process of transformation will at times inevitably weigh more 
heavily on some members of the community than others.”104 
 
What is clear from the jurisprudence on affirmative action is that the implementation of 
affirmative action gets complicated when it involves a person who suffers multiple 
discrimination, for example an Indian woman. The way some courts have resolved such dilemmas 
                                                            
101 Ibid. 
102 2004 (4) SA (CC) 490. 
103 2002 (3) SA 265 (CC); 2002 (9) BCLR 891 (CC). 
104 Ibid at para 7. 
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and the way some employers have implemented employment equity plans have made affirmative 
action a subject of much criticism. The next chapter examines the implementation of affirmative 
action as provided for by the EEA. 
 
 
2.9.  CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has been an exposition of the elements, assumptions and general law 
underlying affirmative action. It has been established that it is the pursuit of substantive 
equality that saw affirmative action being given Constitutional recognition. The chapter 
has also clarified that within every group and every individual in the group, lies 
worthiness (dignity) which needs to be acknowledged, respected and protected. The need 
to redress the society has come with casualties of infringement of rights. Both the 
legislature have reacted to the fiasco and laid down principles and measures to ensure 
that affirmative action does not run contrary to the intended purpose of attaining an 
egalitarian state. The next chapter explores how this has been effected and weighs the 























3.1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Having examined the meaning and objectives of affirmative action measures, it must be 
borne in mind that the implementation of these measures has a profound effect on both 
the designated groups as well as the non-designated groups. One must be careful that in 
implementing affirmative action measures, the other fundamental constitutional rights of 
others are not unjustifiably infringed. In Barnard, Moseneke ACJ, pointed out that: 
 
“We must be careful that the steps taken to promote substantive equality do not 
unwittingly infringe the dignity of other individuals - especially those who were 
themselves previously disadvantaged’ he went further to state that whilst the 
remedial measures must be implemented to advance people who have suffered 
past discrimination, equally ‘they must not unduly invade the human dignity of 
those affected by them, if we are truly to achieve a non-racial, non-sexist and 
socially inclusive society.”105 
 
This chapter provides an analysis of the legislation that governs the implementation of 
affirmative action measures as well as the approach by the courts in ensuring lawful 
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32 
 
3.2.   THE PROVISIONS OF THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT 
 
The primary objectives of the EEA106 are to give effect to the constitutional guarantees 
of equality and elimination of unfair discrimination in the workplace.107 The EEA 
therefore aims to ensure “the implementation of employment equity to redress the 
effects of past discrimination in order to achieve a diverse workforce representative of 
our people.”108 The court in Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism and Others109 pointed out that affirmative action measures must be 
implemented within the confines of the Constitution. Section 13 of the EEA obliges 
designated employers to implement affirmative action measures. According to section 
15 of the Act affirmative action measures are measures designed to ensure that suitably 
qualified people from designated groups have equal opportunities and are equitably 
represented across all occupational categories and levels in the workforce of a 
designated employer. In terms of section 15 (3) of the Act, legitimate affirmative action 
measures include preferential treatment and numerical goals, but exclude quotas. 
Sections 16 to 20, 42 and a gazetted Code regulate the drafting of employment equity 
plans. These sections are specific on how plans must be drafted, what must be taken into 
consideration and who must be consulted in the drafting process. In determining the 
compliance of affirmative action measures, section 42 of the EEA sets out the factors to 
be considered, namely: 
 
              “(a) The extent to which suitably qualified people from amongst the 
different designated groups are equitably represented within each 
occupational category and level in that employer’s workforce in relation 
to the- (i) demographic profile of the national and regional economically 
                                                            
106 Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. The preamble sets out the objective of the EEA, as being to ‘promote 
the constitutional right of equality and the exercise of true democracy’; to ‘eliminate unfair discrimination in 
employment’; to ‘ensure the implementation of an employment equity to redress the effects of discrimination’; 
to ‘achieve a diverse workforce broadly representative of our people’; to ‘promote economic development and 
efficiency in the workforce’; and to ‘give effect to the obligations of the Republic as a member of the 
International Labour Organisation’. 
107 Sections 5 and 6 of the EEA. 
108 Barnard, supra, at para 40. 
109 Supra at paras 97and 99. 
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active population; (ii) pool of suitably qualified people from designated 
groups from which the employee may reasonably be expected to promote 
or appoint employees; (iii) economic and financial factors relevant to the 
sector in which the employer operates; (iv) present an anticipated 
economic and financial circumstances of the employer; and (v) the 
number of present and planned vacancies that exist in the various 
categories and levels, and the employer’s labour turnover; (b) progress 
made in implementing employment equity by other designated 
employers operating under comparable circumstances within the same 
sector; (c) reasonable efforts made by a designated employer to 
implement it EEP; (d)  the extent to which the designated employer 
has made progress in eliminating employment barriers that at adversely 
affect people from designated groups; and (e)  any other prescribed 
factor.” 
 
In considering the implementation of affirmative action measures Moseneke J in 
Minister of Finance and Another v Van Heerden,110 pointed out that apart from ‘uneven 
race, class and gender attributes of our society, there are other levels and forms of social 
difference relation and systematic under-privilege which still persist’. The courts are 
therefore required to scrutinise in each equality claim “the situation of the complainant 
in society; their history and vulnerability; the history, nature and purpose of the 
discriminatory practice and whether it ameliorates or adds to group disadvantage in real 
life context.”111 He pointed out further that in the assessment of fairness, a flexible but 
“situation-sensitive”112 approach is indispensable because of the “shifting patterns of 
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3.3.   EMPLOYMENT EQUITY PLANS 
 
As previously indicated affirmative action is a valid defence against a claim of unfair 
discrimination.114 Like all government policies, affirmative action is subject to the rule 
of law.115 Therefore, it is not enough that an employer accused of unfairly discriminating 
an employee/s raise affirmative action as a defence and end there. “The employer must 
rely on standards that have been developed for that purpose; those standards must not 
exceed the adequate protection and advancement of the favoured groups or categories 
of persons.”116 Failure to have a plan which Hiemstra dubbed “standards” in 
implementing affirmative action, takes away the validity of affirmative action as a 
defence against unfair discrimination. 
 
The legislature was particular as to the way in which affirmative action should be 
implemented. It is a must for every designated employer to have employment equity 
plans in place.117 It has been held that the term “designed”   in section 15 (1) of the EEA 
means that there should be a plan through which restitutionary measures are to be carried 
out.118 The Supreme Court of Appeal in Gordon v Department of Health: KwaZulu-
Natal,119 considered whether an employer may merely point to the need to advance 
persons from a designated group, as a defence to an allegation of unfair discrimination. 
The court held that: 
                                                            
114 Naidoo vs Minister of Safety and Security and another 2013 (7) BLLR 490 (LC) , para 113; Section 13 
and 6 (2)(a) of the Employment Equity Act, 1998. 
115 J Grogan “Affirming the EEA” Employment Law Journal. 
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“It is not sufficient that the purpose of the measures in question is to redress past 
discrimination - the means selected to effect that purpose must be reasonably 
capable of doing so. …. to ensure that affirmative action programmes are 
carefully constructed in ways which are best able to accomplish what they set out 
to achieve.”120 
 
Failure to comply with this requirement would result in a haphazard implementation of 
affirmative action which is not only chaotic but impermissible. 
 
The Act requires that there should be consultations amongst employers and 
employees.121 The consultation is meant to ensure that interests of all employees are 
represented.122  The absence of consultation can give an impression that the employer 
has an untrammeled discretion to earmark posts for a certain racial group.123 Out of such 
consultations, a plan should be drafted and registered with the labour department before 
implementation.124 The plan must be drawn from both regional and national 
demographics and identify gaps in representivity that need to be addressed.125 A proper 
implementation of the plan ought to show how the workplace will become more 
representative.126 According to the SCA in Gordon v Department of Health, KwaZulu-
Natal127 and the Labour Court in IMATU v Greater Louis Trichardt Transitional Local 
                                                            
120 Gordon v Department of Health: KwaZulu-Natal  (2008) 11 BLLR 1023 (SCA),para 22 
121 Section 13, 16 and 17 of the EEA. 
122 Section 16. 
123 M Solomon “Regulation Of Affirmative Action By The Employment Equity Act  55 Of 1998” (1999) 11 SA 
Merc LJ ,pg1422. 
124 Section 20 (1) of the EEA. 
125 Solidarity and Others v Department of Correctional Services and Others [2013] ZALCCT 38 (18 October 
2013), para 37 and 38.  . 
126  In other words the plan should increase the representation of people from designated groups in each 
occupational category and level in the employer's workforce, where under-representation has been identified 
and to make the workforce reflective of the relevant demographics. 
127 Gordon v Department of Health, KwaZulu-Natal (2008) 29 ILJ 2535 (SCA). 
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Council,128 this requirement ensures that there are clear known standards against which 
the implementation of affirmative action is measured or tested and ensure full 
participation in the establishment of the programme. 
 
 
3.4.   RATIONALITY  
 
The Act requires that the plan meant for giving effect to affirmative action must be 
rational.129  An appointment of a person simply because he/she is black is irrational.130 
 
“An employer cannot not prefer one group of designated employees over another 
group of designated employees who are supposedly over-represented in the 
absence of proper proof of such representativeness and a valid EEP which permits 
the action of the employer.”131  
 
The requirement for rationality is meant to ensure that an equity plan provides a 
basis upon which it can be measured as to whether restitutionary measures meet 
the constitutional objective. The constitutional objective is the attainment of 
substantive equality.132 
 
Rationality and proportionality concern standards of judicial scrutiny. Rationality is a 
non-exacting standard that allows a significant measure of latitude to the decision 
maker. It is not the function of the court’s to second guess the decision maker: the 
enquiry is whether there is a rational connection between the premise and the conclusion 
or the logical relation of a measure to its objectivity. It is about whether the decision is 
rationally justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it and the purpose of the measure 
                                                            
128 (2000) 21 ILJ 1119 (LC) at paras 19 to 25.   
129 Munsamy vs Minister of Safety and Security and another 2013 (7) BLLR 695 (LC). 
130 Gordon v Department of Health: KwaZulu-Natal (2008) 11 BLLR 1023 (SCA). 
131 Munsamy, supra, para 18. 
132 Stoman v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2002 (3) SA 468 (T) at 480B – D. 
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in question. The court does not have the power to consider less onerous alternatives to 
deal with a legal problem.133  It shall be contended later that the rationality test suggested 
for affirmative action by the CC is derived from a narrow interpretation of the provisions 
of section 9(2) of the Constitution. This merely requires that the measure taken in line 
with affirmative action must be intended to balance representation in the workplace and 
secondly must be capable of doing so. 
 
 
3.5.   PROPORTIONALITY 
 
Proportionality refers to a standard of judicial scrutiny that involves the balancing of 
contending values and interests. The standard is used by decision makers to determine 
whether a measure has exceeded the requirements for attaining a legitimate goal. This 
usually involves a cost benefit analysis. It has been contended that this standard of 
review will not defeat the remedial goal because the enquiry does not end with the 
consideration of the impact of affirmative action on a complainant. Proportionality goes 
on to balance contended interests taking into account all relevant factors. The 
cumulative effect of these factors determines which side weighs more than the other.134 
The provision of section 6(2) and 9(2) and section 13 of the EEA ensures that the redress 
goal is given its due weight. In this enquiry, given the particular circumstances and 
context it may be appropriate to give more weight to redress than other interests or 
rights. It is a context sensitive approach.  
 
It has also been contended that a program designed to discriminate against certain people 
on the basis of race and gender and to thus exclude these people from socio-economic 
benefits should be scrutinised using the criteria of proportionality. Proportionality is 
                                                            
133 Merafong v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (5) SA 171 (CC) at para 63. 
134 Pretorius JL, Labour Law, Employment Equity Law July 2012   
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preferable because of its ability to account for the duty to redress imbalances and at the 
same time cater for individual rights. Proportionality is more compatible with the 
attainment of an egalitarian state because it is cognisant of competing interests and 
strikes an optimal reasonable balance in accommodating them.135        
 
This dissertation contends that where a measure on the basis of race excludes workers 
from benefits in the workplace, especially those from the designated group, as a matter 
of social policy, we require that its justification rise to a particularly high standard. This 
is so even though our racial history may be invoked in order to justify such measures.  
 
It will also be contended that the use of rationality as a standard of scrutiny for 
affirmative action fails to integrate conflicting interests and rights. Rationality is an 
inquiry into the logical relation of a measure to its objective. The test requires that the 
measure be causally linked to its objective. The standard of rationality precludes a court 
from enquiring into whether the measure taken could have been done in a less onerous 
way.  
 
It is contended that the absence of fairness undermines the dignity of those not 
considered as beneficiaries or as less deserving beneficiaries.  
 
 
3.6.   QUOTAS 
 
Under-representation refers to the statistical disparity between the representation of 
designated groups in the workplace compared to their representation in the labour 
                                                            
135 Pretorius JL, Labour Law, Employment Equity Law July 2012. 
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market.136 This may indicate the likelihood of barriers in recruitment, promotion, 
training and development.137 To ameliorate under-representation, section 15(3) provides 
for the creation of numerical goals but prohibits the imposition of quotas. Quotas refer 
to all preferential treatments that have the effect of reserving any portion of 
opportunities for a designated group. 
 
There is a desperate attempt to distinguish quotas from numerical goals but courts have 
persistently failed to keep the line of distinction. In the case of Munsamy, it was held: 
 
“The imposition of a strict quota is a rigid measure requiring a certain fixed 
proportion or percentage to be included whereas preferential treatment and goals 
is more flexible allowing the achievement of objectives over a period of time”.138 
 
What this submission holds is that the difference between the two is that a quota’s 
envisaged result is sought after regardless of the circumstances of the matter (more like 
a reserve). “One aims at a goal but one is not required to attain it even if one retains the 
goal.”139 However, the case of Barnard shows that courts only draw the distinction 
between the two on paper but when it comes to application, the difference is lost. The 
court condoned the act of not promoting Barnard even though she was both from a 
designated group and there was no one else to promote. The court did not agree that 
Barnard should have been promoted when no other eligible candidate could be found. 
The court looked at whether such an act would immediately achieve equal 
representivity. This clearly shows that the assertion that goals are achieved ‘over a 
                                                            
136 Code Of Good Practice On The Integration Of Employment Equity Into Human Resource Policies And 
Practices (GenN 1358 in GG 27866 of 4 August 2005). 
137 Solidarity and Others v Department of Correctional Services and Others [2013] ZALCCT 38 (18 October 
2013),para 42. 
138 Para 18; this was identical to the US judgement in In Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers’ International 
Association v EEOC, where  O’Connor J, drew the distinction between quotas and goals by holding that ‘A 
quota would impose a fixed number or percentage which must be attained, or which cannot be exceeded, and 
would do so regardless of the number of potential applicants who would meet necessary qualifications …… 
By contrast, a goal is a numerical objective, fixed realistically in terms of the number of vacancies expected, 
and the number of qualified applicants are available in the relevant job’ 




period of time’ was not followed, the court obsessed over immediate results. In Coetzer 
v Minister of Safety and Security140 Landman J, found that the employment target of 
70:30 in favour of designated groups in the South African Police Service did not in itself 
constitute a quota; but to the extent that it reserved posts for designated or non-
designated groups status, it clearly the functions a quota.141 Athough the quota system 
is prohibited, the improper application of numerical targets creates an illusory right to 
many. 
 
One of the factors that an employer who drafts an equity plan is obliged to take into 
consideration is “the pool of suitably qualified people from designated groups from 
which the employer may reasonably be expected to promote or appoint employees.”142 
It would be reasonable to presume that this factor reflects that a numerical goal cannot 
be pursued even when there is no candidate from the targeted group. This was the 
reasoning of the Labour Court in the case of Barnard. The EEA provides that 
implementation of affirmative action should be done after a proper workforce profile 
analysis. Failure to do so would create an absolute barrier. 
 
It is appalling that the CC ruled that an employer may decide to leave a post vacant 
without running the risk of unfairly discriminating certain categories of people. The 
majority judgment held that as long as there is a rational connection between the purpose 
and the decision, such a decision passes constitutional muster.143 The minority judgment 
argued that such a deferential approach would leave the defence of affirmative action in 
unfettered control of those in positions of designated employers. 
 
In support of this argument Whitcher AJ rightfully held that: 
 
“The absence of material prejudice does not detract from a finding of unfair 
discrimination because, while prejudice is highly relevant, the main mischief 
                                                            
140 (2003) 2 BLLR 173 (LC), (2002) 11 LC 6.9.2. 
141 Ibid at Para 23. 
142 Guideline 8.4.2 of the Code gazzeted to regulate the implementation of employment equity plans. 
143 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden (2004) 13 CC at par 36 
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guarded against in the right not to be unfairly discriminated and solatium awarded 
in unfair discrimination cases is the infringement of the right to dignity.”144 
 
Although the CC held that an employer is not obliged to appoint when an affirmative 
action candidate of their choice cannot be found, the Labour Court found that this 
decision would constitute unfair discrimination in certain circumstances.  Steenkamp J 
in Solidarity obo Van der Walt and others v SAPS and others145 noted the holding of the 
LAC in para 47 in Barnard but also noted that the LAC had not considered the question 
of an absolute barrier to promotion. On the other hand, his brother Lagrange J in 
Solidarity v Department of Correctional Services146 stated in para 24: 
 
“In terms of section 15(2)(d) of the EEA, measures to ensure equal opportunities 
for suitably qualified individuals from designated groups and to achieve equitable 
representation in the workplace may include numerical targets and preferential 
treatment, but may not adopt quotas. What appears to have happened in this 
instance is that even when no suitably qualified person from a designated 
category was available, the [employee] could not be appointed. Thus, even when 
the EEP could not achieve the objectives of appointing a suitably qualified person 
from a designated group, the employee’s race was an insuperable obstacle to his 
appointment. It would seem on this basis that the [employee] might well have 
been discriminated against solely on the basis of his race and not for the purpose 
of advancing a suitably qualified person from a designated group pursuant to the 
legitimate aims of an employment equity plan.”     
 
On this basis Steenkamp found that unfair discrimination had been established, namely 
that affirmative action had not been used for a legitimate equity purpose “…the 
[employee] might well have been discriminated against solely on the basis of his race 
and not for the purpose of advancing a suitably qualified person from a designated group 
pursuant to the legitimate aims of an EEP.”147 So it is quite questionable that one of the 
                                                            
144 Munsamy, supra. 
145 (2013) 34 ILJ 2943 (LC). 
146 (2012) 11 BLLR 1163 (LC). 
147 In Birjalal the court found that the decision based on affirmative action was irrational and not lawful because 
the employer was unable to connect the targets and demographic formula relied upon to their equity plan. The 
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reasons the CC did not find in favour of Barnard was the absence of prejudice. It can 
however, be reasonably concluded that the dignity of Barnard was infringed. 
 
There has been a considerable debate as to which demographics should be used in the 
workforce profile analysis. The main concern was that different racial groups are not 
evenly distributed and if equity plans were to be based on national demographics, certain 
groups would be prejudiced even though they belong to the designated group. For 
example, it is common knowledge that there is a high concentration of the Indians in 
KwaZulu Natal than anywhere else in the country and a high concentration of Coloureds 
in the Cape. So if the national demographics were to be applied, members of those races 
would be prejudiced and be overlooked. The same subject came under the spotlight in 
the case of Solidarity and Others v Department of Correctional Services and Others.148 
The court decided that regional as well as national demographics should be taken into 
consideration.149 The amendments to the EEA confirmed the court’s ruling and made 




3.7. ABSOLUTE BARRIERS 
 
An absolute barrier refers to an obstruction which impedes the progress or advancement 
of an employee in his career, regardless of their accomplishments and merits.150 The 
EEA is mandated to ensure that all employees are given equal opportunities to make 
progress in their careers. The Act provides some protection to persons who are not from 
the designated groups, and permits the employer a degree of latitude, to the extent that 
                                                            
court held that where an employer relies on demographics to make a decision the employer must be able to 
show a rational connection between a defined standard in an EEP and the demographics relied on. The first 
respondent’s witnesses did not know how and when the figures it had relied on to select the second respondent 
over the applicant were developed and whether they were still applicable. 
148 (2013) ZALCCT 38 (18 October 2013). 
149 (2013) ZALCCT 38 (18 October 2013), para 45. 




section 15 (4) provides that an employer may not implement a practice or policy that 
“would establish an absolute barrier to the prospective or continued employment or 
advancement of people who are not from designated groups”. Clearly this Section does 
not permit the employment of affirmative action measures that would create an absolute 
barrier to the ‘employment or advancement’ of those not from the designated groups. 
However this does not militate against preferential treatment for persons deemed to have 
been prejudiced by historical factors, namely apartheid. This is permitted so that the 
constitutional objective of an egalitarian state does not ring hollow.151 
  
The fact that the African majority were the most severely impacted group by the policies 
of apartheid has been abused by many designated employers. This has seen Indians and 
Coloureds expressing that during apartheid they were not white enough for privilege 
and after 1994 they are not black enough for privilege. Such dissatisfaction emanates 
from what has become common practice, namely the hierarchy of privilege. The EEA 
does not in any way provide for disparate degrees of prejudice of persons in the 
designated group. It appears that this is a product of adjudication which goes against the 
notion that holds that it is inimical to the goal of affirmative action that an individual’s 
degree of disadvantage be determined.152 Pretorius concedes that it is not necessarily 
true that all persons from the designated group suffered equally but cautions that 
selection for a job from these people should be done on the basis of demonstrable need, 
and not on any arbitrary form of hierarchical ranking of the groups.153 Surely this 
dissatisfaction has no room in a democratic society and ought to be rectified. “The 
Constitution’s injunction to heal the divisions of the past cannot contemplate law or 
conduct which add salt to the wounds caused by the divide and rule policy of by-gone 
eras…freedom is indivisible.”154 
 
                                                            
151 Van Heerdern [2004] 12 BLLR 1181 (CC), para 35. 
152 C Albertyn 
153 JL Pretorius “ Legal evaluation of affirmative action in South Africa” 2001 Journal for Juridical Science 
26(3): pg 24. 
154 Solidarity and Others v Department of Correctional Services and Others2013] ZALCCT 38 (18 October 
2013), para 48. 
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Priority ought to be in terms of a group of persons that is under represented.  Under 
representation should therefore be the determining factor when making employment 
decisions. Workforce profile audits often indicate imbalances in representations. The 
EEA mandates employers to identify the possible reasons for such imbalances.155 In 
Naidoo v Minister of Safety and Security and Another,156 Shaik AJ, pointed out that:  
 
“The very purpose of an employment equity is to ‘redress the effects of past 
discrimination suffered by members of a designated group. It's purpose is not to 
create de facto barriers to employment. The fact that the barrier is created and 
results in a person from a designated group suffering from discrimination, both 
on her grounds of race and gender, is perverse.”157 
 
Measures taken to ameliorate such imbalances ought to be progressive and not 
despotically instant (achieved overnight).158 This is so because at times, imbalances are 
caused by the absence of suitably qualified candidates. It can also because the region in 
question has an over concentration of persons of a designated group. Overemphasis on 
instant solution to imbalances will lead to the creation of absolute barriers.  
 
 
3.8. CONCLUSION  
 
The EEA sets out explicitly what is affirmative action, how it ought to be implemented 
and what it ought to strive for. However, polarized interpretations of the Act have seen 
the policy of affirmative action being thrown into disarray. The plight of persons 
belonging to the designated groups and being overlooked has been duly noted. It is for 
                                                            
155  Section 15(2) of the EEA; Code Of Good Practice On The Integration Of Employment Equity Into 
Human Resource Policies And Practices (GenN 1358 in GG 27866 of 4 August 2005). 
156 (2013) 5 BLLR 490 (LC).  
157 Ibid at Para 158. 
158  M Solomon “Regulation Of Affirmative Action By The Employment Equity ACT  55 of 1998” (1999) 11 
SA Merc LJ ,pg238. 
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this reason that the last of this study shall recommend that Human Resources 





































4. CHAPTER 4: BARNARD CONSTITUTIONAL COURT CASE 
 
 
4.1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Constitutional protection ought to be for all South Africans.159 The seven year litigation 
history of Barnard illuminates the development of jurisprudence on the topic of 
affirmative action. The case demands a chapter of its own due to its significant 
contribution to the affirmative action principles. The case confirmed that affirmative 
action is a proper defence to a charge of discrimination. It further laid down the test for 
lawfulness of the implementation of affirmative action. What becomes clear at the end 
of the case is that the EEA in mandating affirmative action requires the exercise of a 
discretion that comprehends a balancing of all the factors relevant to the decision. A 
context-based proportional interrelationship balanced and weighed according to the 
fundamental constitutional values called into play by the situation.160 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine this judicial debate and ask whether the CC in 
Barnard has clarified the matter and whether it assists the plight of the designated groups 
who have become marginalised. The facts of the Barnard case will be used to examine 
this issue since this case has dominated the judicial debate. Other cases will be referred 







                                                            
159 Fourie and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [2004] ZASCA 132 para 9. 
160 Sachs in Van Heerden. 
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4.2.  BACKGROUND  
 
Ms Renate Barnard (Barnard), a white female police officer161 was denied promotion to 
a level 9 post of Superintendent, twice; in order to ensure the effective pursuit of the 
numerical goals for racial representivity set out in the South African Police Services 
(SAPS) affirmative action policy; even though she had been found to be the most suitable 
candidate. The appellant162 had justified this decision on the basis that it was in line with 
efforts to attain equitable representivity in its workforce regime. The officer then 
challenged the decision on the grounds that it constituted direct discrimination because 
the only reason she was denied promotion was her racial identity. She alleged that the 
refusal to appoint her was an infringement of her right to equality as well as an affront 
to her dignity. What made it worse was that the post was left vacant simply because a 
suitable candidate could not be found from the designated group. Neither did the 
commissioner opt to appoint the second best candidates who were black males. 
 
 
4.3.  ISSUES  
 
 
The prominent issue in the entire litigation history of Barnard was the question whether 
she had been unfairly discriminated on the ground of race. 163 This issue could only be 
adjudicated upon by determining the lawfulness of the way the SAPS 





                                                            
161Ms Barnard Hereinafter referred to as Barnard. 
162The term appellant shall be used to refer to interchangeably as the South African Police Service or the 
Commissioner throughout. 




4.4.  CAUSES OF ACTION AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
 
The CC in Barnard said that courts can scrutinize whether the measure in question is a 
legitimate restitution measure (AA measure) within the scope of section 9(2) of the 
Constitution and that the application of a properly adopted AA measure – i.e. within 
section 9(2) – may be challenged.  
 
The CC stated that the courts must identify whether the complainant:  
(i) Is challenging the constitutionality of the EEA [the provisions of the Act] 
(ii) Is challenging the constitutionality and/or validity of the measure itself [of the 
equity plan devised by the employer in question]. 
(iii) Has a genuine unfair discrimination claim. The CC required this claim to be 
linked to a challenge to the constitutionality and validity of the measure itself [of 
the equity plan devised by the employer in question]. An unfair discrimination 
claim can only arise where the claimant has successfully challenged the 
constitutionality or validity of the measure itself. 
(iv) Is challenging the lawfulness of the measure itself [of the provisions of the equity 
plan devised by the employer in question]165  
(v) Is challenging the implementation of a lawfully adopted measure [the manner in 
which affirmative action measures drafted in accordance with the EEA is 
implemented]166 
 
The CC stressed that courts must identify the real nature of the legal challenge [cause of 
action] because they are subject to different standards of judicial review. Thus it must be 
clear whether a law or rule is being challenged or whether conduct is being challenged, 
                                                            
165 Sections 13 to 20 and s42 if the EEA provide for the process to be followed when drafting affirmative action 
measures [an equity plan]   
166 In Barnard, the court said the pleaded issue was only whether the EEP was lawfully implanted.  
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i.e. the manner in which legitimate affirmative action measures are being implemented. 
The relevant standard of judicial review of each of these causes of action is discussed in 
the next chapter.  
 
A further cause of action not mentioned by the CC involves asserting a failure on the 
part of the employer to comply with its statutory duties under the EEA [claims based on 
alleged breaches of obligations by designated employers as set out in Chapter III of the 
EEA]. However, the LAC held that individuals may not approach the court directly on 
such causes of action. In Solidarity & others v Department of Correctional Services & 
others,167 the judge held at para [18] that the Dudley judgment bound her in respect of 
its ratio that claims based on alleged breaches of obligations by designated employers as 
set out in Chapter III of the EEA may only come before this court after exhaustion of the 
Chapter V compliance procedures. She ruled that in view of the fact that the applicants 
had not sought to proceed by means of the enforcement procedure contained in Chapter 
V of the EEA, read with the affirmative action obligations set out in Chapter 111, she 
was unable to grant a declarator that the EEP is in breach of the provisions of the EEA. 
Explanatory extracts from the judgment read as follows:  
• The applicants submit that the content of the Department of Correctional 
Services EEP is not consistent with the EEA as viewed through the prism 
of the Constitution. Nor they allege is it consistent with the personnel 
placement practices that ought to be adopted by Department of 
Correctional Services under the Public Service Act and the Correctional 
Services Act. 
 
• Chapter III of the EEA deals with ‘Affirmative action measures’ i.e. the 
obligations of designated employers in terms of the EEA. Chapter V of the EEA 
deals with Monitoring, Enforcement and Legal Proceedings. The architecture of 
the EEA in respect to the administrative compliance route set out in Chapter V 
read with Chapter 111, as opposed to the Chapter 11 unfair discrimination route 
                                                            
167 (2014) 35 ILJ 504 (LC) 
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to this court, was exhaustively dealt with by the LAC in Dudley v City of Cape 
Town.168  
• The genesis of the Dudley matter in the court a quo was a case with four 
components, involving allegations dealing with unfair discrimination, 
affirmative action, constitutional obligations and an alleged unfair labour 
practice.169 Exceptions were taken to these causes of action. 
• The findings of the court, a quo, in relation to two of the claims raised 
before it were the subject of the appeal to the LAC. In that matter Zondo 
JP (as he then was) held in respect of the first claim (and the exception 
thereto) as follows: 
“…..the conduct of a designated employer in failure to give a 
member of the designated group who has applied for employment 
preference to those candidates who are not members of the 
designated group in the filling of a post does not on its own 
constitute unfair discrimination.”170  
• In respect of the second claim (and the exception thereto) the LAC held that- 
“it is not competent to institute proceedings in the Labour Court 
in respect of an alleged breach of any obligation under chapter III 
of the EEA, prior to the exhaustion of the enforcement procedure 







                                                            
168 (2008)29ILJ 2685 (LAC) 
169 Dudley v City of Cape Town (2004) 25 ILJ 305 (LC)  
170 At paragraph 54. 
171 At paragraph 48. 
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 4.5.  CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE  
  MEASURE ITSELF 
 
The LC172 concluded that the failure to promote Barnard was a decision based on 
race and constituted discrimination that was unfair and not in compliance with the 
provisions of the EEA. It held that the EEP had to be applied in accordance with the 
constitutional principles of fairness and equality. It found that the strict application 
of numerical goals was too rigid. It found in favour of Barnard for the reason that the 
SAPS had failed to discharge the onus of fairness of its prima facie discriminatory 
decision considering that the reasons given for its decision were scant. The Labour 
Court decision was influenced by the need to balance interests that are in conflict; 
the need for representativity had to be weighed up against the individual’s rights to 
equality; a fair decision had to be made.  
 
The SAPS appealed that decision to the LAC. The LAC pointed out that the 
implementation of restitutionary measures could not be made, subject to an 
individuals right to equality; it would defeat the very purpose of having restitutionary 
measures as, the fact that there would be persons from non-designated groups who 
would be at adversely effected, was a reality. LAC held that no discrimination had 
occurred because no appointment had been made. It upheld the appeal and set aside 
the order of the Labour Court. The LAC also based its finding on the absence of a 
comparator. Whereas a comparator is an important factor when deciding whether 
there has been discrimination, it cannot on its own deter a finding of discrimination. 
Discrimination can occur where a person’s aspirations have been barricaded on the 
basis of an immutable character like race. 173  An allegation of discrimination requires 
that it be determined what the impact is on the individual complaining. Thus the 
finding of the LAC was wanting for the lack of a wholesome approach, it was 
piecemeal; it cherry-picked only a part that enabled it to get to a desired decision. 
 
                                                            
172 2010 (10) BCLR 1094 (LC).   
173  S Fredman ‘Providing equality: Substantive equality and the positive duty to provide’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 
163 at 182–5. 
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Barnard appealed to the SCA. As in the LC, the SCA held that Barnard had been 
unfairly discriminated when the commissioner failed to promote her. Again like the 
LC, its decision was based on the insufficiency of the commissioner’s reasons for 
failing to appoint Barnard. The fatal mistake made by the SCA (which was later 
addressed by the CC) was its reliance on section 9(3) of the Constitution. By relying 
on this provision it confirmed what the LAC had incorrectly held, namely that the 
LC had made affirmative action subject to the individual right to equality. It reversed 
the decision of the LAC. The approach of the LC and the SCA reflected that in PSA 
and another v Minster of Justice and others174 where the High Court regarded AA 
programs as an exception to the right to be treated equally and therefore needed to 
be subject to an exacting scrutiny. The court held that in deciding the appropriateness 
of an affirmative action measure, the word ‘equal’ must be taken to denote that the 
interests of the beneficiaries are not to be considered in vacuo, but with due regard 
to the rights of others, and to the possible disadvantage that the targeted persons or 
groups might suffer. The court ruled the AA policy of not considering White males 
and only appointing women and black candidates constituted unfair discrimination.  
 
The SAPS then approached the CC. The CC held that the Harksen test175 would be 
only applied if Barnard was challenging the equity plan. It further held that it was 
inappropriate to use the Harksen test because it treats affirmative action as ‘suspect 
and unfair’.176 It consequently dispelled the SCA’s reasoning as based on a wrong 
principle.177 What Moseneke establishes or rather confirms is that it is beyond doubt 
that affirmative action is a valid defence against the allegation of unfair 
discrimination. Thus applying the Harksen test would be inappropriate because it is 
an enquiry as to the constitutionality of affirmative action. If one is to challenge 
                                                            
174 PSA v Minster of Justice (1997) 18 ILJ 241 (T). 
175 The Harksen test first asks whether there has been differentiation. If the answer is in the affirmative, the 
next enquiry would be whether the differentiation is based on a prohibited ground like race. If again the 
answer is I the affirmative the enquiry proceed to ask if the differentiation on the prohibited ground is fair. 
176 Para 51 
177 Para 53 
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affirmative action, the three pronged test laid down in Van Heerdern 178would be the 
appropriate test for it. The Van Heerden test would serve to check whether what is 
held as affirmative action is actually affirmative action or not and not whether 
affirmative action is unfair or not. 
 
The CC confirmed the LAC’s holdings that legitimate implementation of 
restitutionary measures are not subject to an individual’s right to equality in terms of 
section 9(3) of the Constitution. The LAC held that the failure by the SAPS to appoint 
a recommended white female candidate did not constitute unfair discrimination 
where the failure to appoint was in line with a rational, coherent EEP intended to 
redress inequitable representation in the workplace.179 Moseneke in Van Heerden, 
however, held that if a measure does not fall within section 9(2), and it constitutes 
discrimination on a prohibited ground (because, for example, it is race based), it will 
be necessary to resort to the Harksen test in order to ascertain whether the measure 
offends the anti-discrimination prohibition in section 9(3).  
 
 
4.6.  THE LAWFULNESS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION MEASURES 
[THE PLAN] 
 
As indicated earlier, the CC in Van Heerden and Barnard held that if a measure does 
not pass muster under section 9(2) and the conduct of the employer constitutes 
discrimination on a prohibited ground (because, for example, it is race based) it may 
be presumed to be unfair discrimination. It is arguable that the same reasoning can 
be applied to a plan that does not comply with the EEA. Sections 13 to 20 set out 
specific requirements for the drafting of affirmative action plans.   
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The court in Birjalal v Ethekwini Municipality180 and Munsamy held that the term 
‘designed’ entails a properly drafted EEP.181 They held that this means that when an 
employer makes a decision based on affirmative action, for that decision to be upheld 
as rational and fair discrimination, the employer must show, inter alia, that the 
decision was in terms of a clearly defined plan drafted in accordance with the 
specifications provided for in chapter 111 of the EEA.  
 
In Munsamy v Minister of Safety and Security and Another, the Labour Court found 
that the EEP in casu had not been drafted in accordance with the relevant provisions 
of the EEA, especially section 20, in that there was no evidence that the plan was the 
product of a proper consultation process and that the measures used against the 
complainant had been drafted in accordance with the Act and section 20. On this 
basis the court found that since the decision against the complainant had been based 
on a plan inconsistent with the provisions of the EEA, the decision amounted to 
unfair discrimination. 
 
There is merit in this approach on the basis that the CC in Van Heerden held that if 
a measure does not pass the three – fold test (and thus does not fall within section 
9(2)) and it constitutes discrimination on a prohibited ground (because, for example, 
it is race based), it can be deemed unfair until the contrary is proved by the employer.  
 
The CC confirmed that section 15 prohibits quotas and in this regard stated:  
 
“Let it suffice to observe that the primary distinction between numerical targets 
and quotas lies in the flexibility of the standard.  Quotas amount to job reservation 
and are properly prohibited by section 15(3) of the Act.  The same section 
endorses numerical goals in pursuit of work place representivity and equity.  They 
serve as a flexible employment guideline to a designated employer.”182 
                                                            
180 Unreported, 2014 (Whitcher AJ). 
181 Gordon v Department of Health, KwaZulu-Natal (2008) 29 ILJ 2535 (SCA); PSA of SA obo Helberg v 
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 In Solidarity & Others, the LC found that the EEA, particularly section 42, allows for 
proportionality, balance and fairness when it requires both national and regional 
demographics to be taken into account. The court found that the individual applicants 
who were black employees in terms of the EEA had suffered unfair discrimination in 
that the EEP used to decide their applications for appointment did not take regional 
demographics into account.    
 
 Naidoo v Minister of Safety and Security and Another183 and Munsamy scrutinised the 
plans and found that the plans in effect represented a quota and complete barrier to 
appointment and promotion of Indians and thus fell within the parameter of 
presumptively unfair discrimination.   In Munsamy and Naidoo, the court found that the 
since the demographic formulas used by the employer effectively constituted a quota 
system [the EEA prohibits quotas] and resulted in a complete barrier to the promotion 
or appointment of Indian employees, the SAPS had unfairly discriminated against the 
applicant on the grounds of his race.  
 
 Munsamy essentially held that for decisions based on affirmative action to be considered 
lawful, the decision must have been in terms of ‘a rational coherent EEP.’ An employer 
may not prefer one group of designated employees over another group of designated 
employees who are supposedly over-represented in the absence of proper proof of such 
representativeness and a valid EEP which permits the action of the employer. 
 
 The court in Munsamy held that where an employer used affirmative action measures to 
prefer one designated group over another who were supposedly over-represented, the 
employer must prove the following to establish that its conduct was rational and in line 
with a defensible equity plan: (i) that there was an over-representation of the 
discriminated group and an under-representation of the preferred group in the level of 
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the post in question: this requires the conduct of a proper workplace profile audit; (ii) 
that the measure is sufficiently coherent and not open to arbitrary application or abuse; 
(iii) that the measure is permitted by the Act; (iv) an equity plan that permits the disputed 
measure, either expressly or by clear implication; (v) that the measure is intended to 
correct inequitable representation in the workplace; and, (vi) that the measure arose out 




4.7. CHALLENGING THE MANNER OF IMPLEMENTATION OF A 
LAWFUL PLAN  
 
As indicated earlier on, the CC noted that the Barnard case was not about the 
constitutionality or the legal validity of the EEP devised by the police (The validity of 
the plan was never challenged). The court stated that Bernard’s statement of claim 
contained a narrow case, namely that the National Commissioner of Police acted lawfully 
when he twice declined to appoint Barnard as superintendent in order to ensure the 
effective pursuit of the numerical goals for racial representivity set out in the SAPS 
affirmative action policy. The reasons advanced in support of the narrow case were that 
the National Commissioner attached undue weight to demographic equity at the expense 
of her competency and furnished inadequate reasons [his letter reflecting his decision 
was silent on factors he weighed]. 
 
The issue in dispute was thus about the application of a valid plan [valid affirmative 
action measures].   
 
The CC judges in Barnard seemed to differ on the exact standard imposed by the EEA 
to measure whether a constitutionally valid EEP was implemented lawfully in a 
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particular case [i.e. in cases directed not at unfair discrimination under section 6(1) of 
the EEA, but at a review of an employer’s decision]. 
 
In the main judgment, Moseneke did not finally answer this question, but merely held 
that at bear minimum, implementation must pass a legality test: the principle of legality 
would require that a legitimate restitutionary measure must be used for an authorised 
purpose and the decision must be rationally related to the terms and objects of the 
measure. He held that when an EEP is implemented in a capricious manner or for ulterior 
or for an impermissible purpose it would be unlawful. Ordinarily, irrational conduct in 
implementing a lawful project creates an unlawful action. Therefore, implementation of 
corrective measures must be rational. 
 
Moseneke further suggested that affirmative action decisions which prejudice the 
efficiency of the workplace, by for example, appointing non-suitable AA candidates 
would be unlawful and irrational as the decision would be inconsistent with the aims of 
affirmative action: 
“I pause to underline the requirement that beneficiaries of affirmative action must 
be equal to the task at hand. They must be suitably qualified people in order not 
to sacrifice efficiency and competence at the altar of remedial employment. The 
Act sets itself against the hurtful insinuation that affirmative action measures are 
a refuge for the mediocre or incompetent. Plainly, a core object of equality at the 
workplace is to embrace and retain people who are also competent and effective 
in delivering goods and services to the public.”   
 
The CC approved the LAC’s holding that when applying legitimate affirmative action 
measures, the employer does not have to take into account an individual’s right to 
equality. The LAC in SAPS v Solidarity obo Barnard184 held as follows: 
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“The Labour Court clearly misconstrued the purpose of the employment equity 
oriented measures by decreeing that their implementation was subject to an 
individual’s right to equality and dignity. This misconception is highlighted in 
this case where the individual concerned is a white woman, whose group was 
overrepresented in level 9, and who was clearly advantaged by past unfair 
discriminatory laws. Importantly, she did not hope to be appointed as there were 
two appointable black candidates from designated groups. She was also aware 
that black candidates were targeted for the post for which she applied and which 
target was within the conscripts [sic] of National Instruction 1 of 2004.”185 
 
The LAC held that the failure by the SAPS to appoint a recommended white female 
candidate did not constitute unfair discrimination where white females were over-
represented in the level of the advertised post and the failure to appoint was in line with 
a rational, coherent EEP intended to redress inequitable representation in the workplace.  
 
The LAC’s approach merely requires that the affirmative action measure must be 
intended to balance representation in the workplace and as long as it can be shown that 
there exists an EEP designed in accordance with Chapter 111, any employment decision 
based on it is beyond judicial scrutiny. 
 
The minority judgments said that fairness should be the test for lawful exercise of an 
employer’s discretion: the decision maker must put up sufficient reasons for 
implementation to be fair. They found the National Commissioner’s reasons were 
inadequate, but held that there were external factors that rendered his decision fair. This 
include the fact that there was an overrepresentation of white females at the occupational 
level in question, which meant that the Commissioner could place more weight on racial 
targets as opposed to any other considerations he was bound to consider when making 
his decision. This approach is akin to the proportionality test. 
                                                            




In applying the doctrine of legality and the rationality test to the discretion afforded to 
the National Commissioner as contained in the national instruction, the majority found 
there was nothing to conclude that in exercising his discretion not to appoint and to 
withdraw the post, the National Commissioner did so unlawfully. The Court concluded 
that the exercise of discretion not to appoint was rational and reasonable and in 
accordance with criteria in National Instruction, in pursuit of employment equity targets 
envisaged in the EEA. The court’s decision was based on the following reasons: 
• in addition to existing or potential competence, other relevant criterion is that 
promotion must heed the EEP of the relevant business unit; 
• the National Commissioner was empowered in terms of the EEP to decline to 
promote candidate because her appointment would worsen representivity at the 
salary level (9) and the post was not critical for service delivery;186    
• Ms Barnard’s non-appointment did not sacrifice service delivery. 
• the National Commissioner was entitled to refuse to fill the vacancy for the reason 
that it would have negatively affected the numerical targets of the EEP;187  
• the EEP obliged the National Commissioner to take steps to achieve the targets, 
provided he acted rationally and with due regard to the criteria in the National 
Instruction;  
• it was his right and duty to achieve targets. 
 
The CC found that the commissioner did not pursue the targets too rigidly to comprise 
job reservation or quotas for two reasons188: 
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• over-representation of white women at salary level 9 was pronounced, which meant 
SAPS had not pursued racial targets at the expense of other relevant considerations; 
had appointed white female employees despite equity targets; and the white females 
retained their posts; 
 
• the decision not to promote her did not bar her from future promotions – she was 
Lieutenant-Colonel at time of hearing before CC; she had been promoted past salary 
level 9 to 10 or higher; her promotion was not precluded by race as an absolute bar. 
 
The CC also found that Ms Barnard was always aware and accepted that her interview 
and selection would occur within the strictures imposed by employment equity; she 
accepted that even if she was the best candidate, that was not the only criterion; she was 
aware of over-representation of white females at salary level 9; and if Mr Mogadima 
and Mr Ledwaba had been appointed ahead of her, she would have no grievance189. 
 
In summary then, according to the majority, the decision of the commissioner was not 
irrational because: 
(i) the SAPS EEP was not implemented in an overly rigid fashion; 
(ii) the EEA does not allow strict and rigid quotas to be enforced but does allow an 
EEP to set targets to be pursued by an employer. Rigid quotas would in effect 
place an absolute bar on the employment or promotion of a member of a 
privileged group. The SAPS EEP did not impose such rigid quotas and neither 
did the manner in which the plan was being implemented. The way in which the 
SAPS had implemented their plan did not amount to pursuing a rigid quota; 
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(iii) there was no evidence that the SAPS plan placed an absolute barrier on the 
appointment of white SAPS members [there was no evidence that the SAPS 
affirmative action policy prevents the promotion of white applicants]; 
(iv) there was a clear need for affirmative action measures in the unit of the SAPS 
under discussion. 
 
It is contended that, even in terms of the strict rationality set by the CC, there was merit 
in the SCA’s contrary decision: the SCA made quite a lot of the irrationality of the 
decision not to appoint Barnard in circumstances where qualified and shortlisted 
candidates were also not appointed. This almost suggested male fides. The CC 





When the Labour Court held that the commissioner could not have applied the equity 
plan “without more”, it meant that after determining that the defence to an allegation of 
discrimination is actually affirmative action, the enquiry does not end there. There is 
more to it. This creates an enquiry as to what exactly should be the appropriate standard 
that should apply when a litigant challenges the implementation of a constitutionally 
compliant restitutionary measure.  
 
It is submitted that an EEP ought to be implemented fairly. The Labour Court held that: 
“… an Employment Equity Plan must be applied fairly with due regard to the 
affected   individual’s right to equality and that representivity must be weighed 
against that right. It added that it was not appropriate to apply without more 
numerical goals set out in an Employment Equity Plan.”190  
                                                            




Ms Barnard scored very well before the interviewing panel, not once but twice. At all 
times, her race stood in her way of career progress. 
 
The majority judgment in the CC preferred rationality as the test for the implementation 
of affirmative action. It averred that once the plan passes the three tier test191 the 
restitutionary measure cannot be held to be unfair “because the Constitution says so.”192 
However, Moseneke was quick to add that this however, does not oust the court’s power 
to interrogate whether the measure is a legitimate restitutionary measure within the 
scope of the empowering section 9(2).  He went on to say that the implementation of a 
legitimate plan can be challenged.193 He explicitly stated that rationality was a minimum 
standard. It is, however, surprising and disappointing that did not provide closure as to 
what the appropriate standard would be. One can safely infer that he was satisfied with 
rationality as a proper test for scrutinizing the implementation of restitutionary 
measures. 
  
Van Der Westhuizen J defined the third requirement in the Van Heerden three prong test. 
He managed to identify how fairness as a standard can be deduced from the Van 
Heerden’s three prong test. He held that “The word ‘achievement’ implies some effect 
or impact.”194 Whereas Moseneke was of the opinion that  the commissioner’s decision 
was lawful because it was in accordance with his powers,195 Van Der Westhuizen J 
disagreed , correctly it is submitted , and held that a “measure might be legitimate in 
form, but its application may be unlawful.”196 He thus resonated the finding of the 
Labour Court that affirmative action measures cannot be implemented “without more”. 
                                                            
191 As was held in Van Heerden and which can be paraphrased as checking whether the measure advance 
designated person and whether such has a possibility of achieving equality. 
192 Para 37. 
193 Par 38 
194 At 143. 
195 Para 62. 
196 Para 145. 
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It therefore is settled that the effect and implementation of affirmative action need to be 
evaluated if the conflict of rights involved in restitution is to be settled harmoniously. 
 
 
4.9. SETTLING CONFLICT OF RIGHTS 
 
“There will always be tension between fullness and limitation. It is good 
to work slowly but surely without obsessing about immediate results, to 
endure adverse situations. It needs to be realized that there will always be 
tension between reality and ideas. Reality is greater. We are called to 
action by the realities clarified by reason. We cannot lose alertness to the 
big picture while busy with details.”197 
 
The implementation of restitutory measures always encounter conflict of rights. Courts 
are often at peril of preferring one constitutional imperative over another. This was the 
mistake both the Labour Court and the subsequent LAC committed. The LAC also 
reasoned that individual rights are secondary to individual rights because doing so 
would adversely affect the objective of affirmative action namely restitution. Fortunate 
enough the CC clarified how best to solve the dichotomy in our law regarding the 
implementation of affirmative action. Section 9 of the Constitution and section 6 of the 
EEA prohibit unfair discrimination and yet go on to make permissive a policy that 
discriminates. The conflict that arises therefrom is the dilemma of having to affirm the 
disadvantaged and avoid stepping on the dignity of those disfavoured. 
 
The SCA held that the EEA in mandating affirmative action requires the exercise of a 
discretion that comprehends a balancing of all the factors relevant to the decision. 
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Moseneke acknowledged that the adjudication of such matters is quite delicate. He held 
that:  
  
“Measures that are directed at remedying past discrimination must be formulated 
with due care not to invade unduly the dignity of all concerned. We must remain 
vigilant that remedial measures under the Constitution are not an end in 
themselves. They are not meant to be punitive nor retaliatory. Their ultimate goal 
is to urge us on towards a more equal and fair society that hopefully is non-racial, 
non-sexist and socially inclusive.198 ………….We must be careful that the steps 
taken to promote substantive equality do not unwittingly infringe the dignity of 
other individuals”.199 
 
It is expected that this acknowledgement of the sensitivity of such matters makes it more 
onerous on decision makers to be thorough in their reasoning. It also is disappointing to 
note that Moseneke ended at highlighting the minimum standard of scrutiny after having 
highlighted the matter before him as volatile.  
 
Cameron whilst writing for the minority was clear on what standard should be used in 
mediating the dichotomy referred to above. He argued that the test for whether 
implementation of affirmative action is contrary to the Act and the Constitution is 
fairness.200 He reasoned that such should be the criteria so as to “ensure a decision-
maker has carefully evaluated relevant constitutional and statutory imperatives before 
making a decision that relies predominantly on one of the criteria such as race.”201  He 
also reasoned that if that were not the case “it would be difficult ever to hold that a 
decision-maker had impermissibly converted a set of numerical targets into quotas.” 202 
He was correct in holding that rationality fails to balance the conflict of rights at play.  
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Cameron kept an open mind to challenges faced with using fairness as a standard. 
However he was quick to dissolve any doubts by giving examples of legal concepts 
which have been clarified through the development of jurisprudence.203 Cameron 
elaborated that the standard of fairness enables one to determine whether the 
implementation has been done in accordance with the purpose of the act and not whether 
it is constitutional. By so doing he dispelled the misunderstanding that fairness questions 
whether affirmative action is constitutional or not. 
 
It therefore followed that the reasons given by the commissioner were the subject of 
enquiry to determine fairness of the implementation. It did not mean that the enquiry 
transformed into a review application. It was simply relevant to the contention already 
laid before court by Barnard. 
 
Even though Cameron agreed with the SCA that the commissioner’s reasons were not 
substantial, he was satisfied that they together with external factors pointed to the fact 
that the commissioner managed to balance the conflicting rights.204 
 
To the concern that Barnard came from a women’s group which is also a designated 
group, the court adequately addressed this concern by reference to statistics which 
revealed that there was an even split between women and men.205 However reference to 
salary levels revealed a huge gap of pay grades between men and women. Cameron 
recognised the prerogative of the commissioner on condition it was reasoned fairly. He 
reasoned such deference was necessitated by our historical background. One can note 
that Cameron seems to have fallen back on rationality against his earlier 
recommendation of proportionality. He explained his reasoning by adding that the 
decision maker must also take into account factors making up the person’s identity and 
possible ways in which he could advance the restitutionary goal.206 The Constitution 
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and the Act require a holistic approach to the EEP in order to give effect to the Act’s 
objectives. 
 
In the words of Sachs J in Van Heerden:  
  
“[W]here different constitutionally protected interests are involved, it is prudent 
to . . . opt for context-based proportional interrelationships, balanced and weighed 
according to the fundamental constitutional values called into play by the 
situation.”207 
 
This serves to guard against the establishment of absolute barriers. 
 
 
4.10. ABSOLUTE BARRIERS  
 
Section 15(4) of the EEA provides that: 
  
“Subject to section 42, nothing in this section requires a designated employer to 
take any decision concerning an employment policy or practice that would 
establish an absolute barrier to the prospective or continued employment or 
advancement of people who are not from designated groups.” 
 
The above section serves as a safety net against the abuse of restitutionary measures. It 
is one of the guidelines on how affirmative action ought to be implemented. Thus it 
provides that even though diversity is the objective, such goal should not be attained in 
a manner that disregards equal dignity and respect for all people.208 This can only be 
achieved if the approach to restitution measures is flexible. A situation whereby 
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designated employers obsess over achieving immediate results can make their approach 
rigid and consequently unlawful. 
 
The establishment of absolute barriers in the form of quotas is unlawful.209 Moseneke 
refrained from defining the term ‘quotas’ as he reasoned that it was not a matter that 
was before him. 210 He, however, was courteous enough to give a distinction between 
quotas and numerical goals. The court held that “…the primary distinction between 
numerical targets and quotas lies in the flexibility of the standard. Quotas amount to job 
reservation and are properly prohibited by section 15(3) of the Act.”211 Numerical goals 
serve as a ‘flexible guideline’ to a designated employer.212 
 
He concedes that if a valid plan is applied rigidly, it may constitute job reservation. 213 
Moseneke rejected the view that the implementation of the plan created quotas for the 
following reasons: firstly, White females were overly represented; to him that meant 
White females had been employed despite equity targets;214 secondly, the 
commissioner’s decision did not bar her future employment or promotion,215 and 
thirdly, she was aware of the equity targets envisaged in the department. The question 
to be asked is does this refute the finding of quotas? The commissioner had chosen to 
create an opportunity to enhance employment equity goals by not appointing her.  
Moseneke found that the decision was reasonable because it was rational.216 
 
Cameron provided a better way of balancing the conflict of rights. He held that “We 
should also be careful not to allow race to become the only decisive factor in 
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employment decisions.” 217 He advocated that caution be taken not to over emphasise 
race to such an extent that we become blind to the plight of other members of society.  
 
“The Act does not countenance employment decisions “that would establish an 
absolute barrier” to the employment or advancement of those not from designated 
groups.218 Employers “must” implement affirmative action measures that benefit 
people from all designated groups. So no affirmative action decision is consistent 
with the purpose of the Act unless it considers the advancement of each of the 
different categories of persons designated by the Act. A decision that redresses 
racial disadvantage but grossly aggravates gender disadvantage, for example, 
might be impermissible, as might a decision that advances only one 
disadvantaged racial group while limiting the others”.  
 
Cameron reasoned that the need to be cautious arises from the similarity that affirmative 
action has with the medium of oppression used under apartheid. Cameron held that even 
though the plan’s employability of Indian women was 0.4, it would be absurd to insist 
that they not be employed. He thus stressed the need for flexibility. 
Cameron also disagreed with Moseneke’s finding that there was no question of absolute 
barriers with regards to the implementation of the equity plan.219 He argued that this 
question was clear from the Barnad’s papers and went on to quote it verbatim. 
 
 
4.11. CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
 
The court in Munsamy however appeared to support a strict rationality test, rather than 
a test based on fairness. It held that:  
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“whether a court may be called upon to adjudicate the fairness, in the wide sense 
of the word, of ‘measures’, especially where they have been the subject of proper 
consultation and agreement between management and labour in the consultative 
forum and where the aggrieved parties have the right to advance their interests 
through political and industrial action, is debatable.” 220 
It was only prepared to set aside the employer’s decision on the ground that the 
demographic formula used amounted to a quota system and a complete barrier to further 
promotion for Indian employees.  
 
The LAC held that a plan must be crafted in terms of section 20 of the EEA.221 The LAC 
found that the plan was crafted with due regard to the SAPS’s workplace dynamics and 
identifies the gaps requiring attention as well as providing for a programme of action that 
is time bound regarding the closing of gaps.222 It cannot be argued that the plan seeks the 
appointment of only blacks irrespective of other criteria. One of the criteria set out in the 
plan is the suitability of candidates. The LAC held that the Labour Court clearly 
misconstrued the purpose of affirmative action measures by decreeing that their 
implementation was subject to an individual’s right to equality. It noted that this 
misconception is highlighted in this case, where the individual concerned is a white 
woman whose group is overrepresented in the relevant occupational level.  
 
The EEA provides for a process to be followed when drafting an equity plan. The central 
principle adopted by the LAC and CC in Bernard is that once an equity plan has been 
drafted in accordance with the EEA and properly adopted it is beyond scrutiny, i.e. its 
implementation was rational and not reviewable. Both courts held that a decision to 
overlook a dedicated and excellent white female candidate had been made in terms of a 
properly drafted EEP and therefore justified. It was held that the plan was rational 
because it identified gaps and set timed measures to address such disparities and that it 
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did not just seek appointment of blacks but of suitably qualified blacks. It further held 
that regard to individual rights would defeat the constitutional purpose of redress because 
affirmative action would always have an adverse effect on the rejected candidates.      
 
In a nutshell, the approach of the LAC and CC merely requires that the AA measure must 
be intended to balance representation in the workplace and as long as it can be shown 
that there exists an EEP designed in accordance with Chapter 111, any employment 
decision based on it is beyond judicial scrutiny. But is this correct considering that the 
EEA defines the employer’s obligation in terms such as achieving ‘equitable 
representation’ which is defined to mean “fair and reasonable” in the dictionary?  
 
The LAC, the SCA and the minority in Barnard appeared to insert a proportionality test: 
a balancing of interests and the weight of the balance will be determined by the specific 
context and facts of each case. They suggest that in certain situations, more weight 
should be placed on other facts as opposed to racial targets and more weight should only 
be placed on racial targets when there was a major underrepresentation. The majority, as 





It is submitted that if the implementation of affirmative action is to be evaluated in the 
way the majority reasoned, the benefits of affirmative action will be an illusionary right 
to some persons of the designated groups. 
 
The judgment by Cameron presents a more witful judgment. Despite identifying flaws, 
he found in favour of the applicant. The judgment is more informed and canvasses every 
question that was left wanting by the majority judgment. Unlike the main judgment it 
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did not attempt to evade pertinent issues on technical grounds but faced them and 
immaculately answered them. Now that was justice served. Although it did not find in 























5. CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
5.1.  INTRODUCTION  
 
The previous chapters have made it crystal clear that even though the EEA provides for 
specific ways in which affirmative action should be implemented; a number of abuses 
have been witnessed and tainted the policy of affirmative action. This chapter draws from 
the court’s interpretation of how the occlusion in the implementation of affirmative 
action can best be cleared. 
 
 
5.2.  FLEXIBILITY  
 
The purpose of equity plans is to ensure a diverse workforce. The EEA places the burden 
of giving effect to such purpose on the employer.223 This study recommends that it is 
good to work slowly but surely without obsessing about immediate results. Hence the 
CC held that the achievement of Equity goals should be attained via a flexible 
approach.224 Cameron held that where an equity plan suggests that Indians who are 
employable are 0.4, it does not imply that no Indians should be employed.225 Such an 
application would create barriers and would fly in the face of human dignity. 
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The call to have employment equity plans implemented in accordance with considerable 
flexibility is in line with the acknowledgement that affirmative action involves measures 
that adversely affect certain members of the society. The courts have also held that over 
rigidity in the application of numerical targets would constitute quotas.226 
 
 
5.3.  FURNISHING REASONS 
 
One of the lessons learnt from the jurisprudence developed in the Barnard case is that 
there is need to furnish reasons to a person adversely affected by an employment equity 
decision.227 Anyone who has his or her rights affected is entitled to an explanation in the 
form of written reasons.228 This is important in that a person can evaluate whether the 
limitation imposed on their rights is justified.229 It is also important that such adverse 
decision be explained because doing so ensures public confidence in the system.230 In 
sum, the requirement that every employment equity decision must be backed by written 
reasons boils down to the need to curb against abuse and arbitrariness. If the impression 
that affirmative action has become an illusion for other members of the designated group 
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5.4.  REGIONAL DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
It has been conceded in numerous cases that different races are concentrated in 
different districts.231 This has seen Coloureds being prejudiced in the Western Cape 
and Indians in KwaZulu Natal. Thus this study submits that regional demographics 
should rank higher than national demographics. Failure to do so would strengthen 
the impression that affirmative action is for African persons mostly despite the fact 
that Indians and Coloureds are part of the designated group.  
 
Courts have failed to address the issue of hierarchy of disadvantage. It has been 
accepted that different races suffered differently; the EEA does not provide for 
different degrees of disadvantage among the designated groups. This study 
recommends that legislature should do away with hierarchy of disadvantage. This is 
so because when Africans, Coloureds and Indians were deemed black, it was 
implicitly acknowledged that all these races suffered under apartheid. The legislature 
and courts acknowledged that determining actual prejudice would be inimical to the 
goal of attaining an egalitarian state.232 It is quite surprising that the implementation 
of equity plans has been done as if it is possible to ascertain the extent of prejudice 
of an affirmative action candidate. It is recommended therefore that when 
determining the beneficiary of affirmative action measures, preference should be 
given to the degree of representativity (regional demographics) rather than the degree 




                                                            
231 Solidarity and Others v Department of Correctional Services and others 2013 (7) BLLR 695 (LC).   




5.5.  COMPULSORY TRAINING 
 
It has become necessary that all human resources departments for designated 
employers be trained on how to implement affirmative action measures. The 
preceding chapters have demonstrated how employers have abused affirmative 
action measures. This has emanated both from ill intentions as well as ignorance of 
the policy. It is recommended that the legislature should make it a policy that all 
human resources departments of designated employers undergo specific training on 
how to implement equity plans.  
 
Although equity plans are approved by the labour department first, one cannot help 
but notice that even those who are approving the problematic equity plans need 
training too. The implementation of equity plans seems easy on the face of it but the 
numerous challenges to the plan itself demonstrated that even the department 
requires guidance on this aspect. A properly drafted, rational and coherent plan 
would guard against animosity and despair that may result in those adversely affected 
by the implementation of the measures; it could also curb a haphazard application of 
the affirmative action measure. 
 
 
5.6.  CONCLUSION 
 
Affirmative action involves emotive issues which have raised tension amongst races. 
The above recommendations drew from the jurisprudence that has been developed 
in affirmative action litigation. The pursuit of an egalitarian state demands that 
people move forward from the injustices of the past. It is therefore imperative that 
measures devised to facilitate such transition do not do more harm than good. Thus, 




6.  CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION  
 
The understanding of affirmative action is founded on its purpose, namely to redress the 
effects of apartheid. This understanding has also informed the ways in which the policy 
of affirmative action is implemented. The policy is not to be implemented leaving those 
assumed to be privileged in limbo. There ought to be regard for everyone affected by 
the policy. Of course the policy confused many in its early developmental stages but as 
the jurisprudence developed, clear guidelines were set and left to employers to follow 
and the courts to enforce. 
 
Chapter one of the study outlined the parameters of the study, its background, objective, 
review of literature as well as the point of departure. It was made clear that affirmative 
action is a product of history and a current solution to a problem. 
 
Chapter two of the study explored the understanding and objectives of affirmative action 
measures and the court’s interpretation of the constitutional principles underlying the 
policy of affirmative action. The chapter went further to show how the constitutional 
law is brought into the employment fold. The most important point that was brought to 
bear was that within each individual is a recognised right to dignity. This right/principle 
serves to conscientize policy makers of the effects of their acts. 
 
The gist of chapter three was the criticism of the ways in which affirmative action has 
been implemented. Chapter three highlighted different instances in which the 
implementation of affirmative action has been misconstrued to an extent that it appeared 
as if it was only meant for Africans. The discussion of the provisions of the EEA 
providing for affirmative action served to show what the law says on affirmative action. 




As the study went into chapter four it became clear that there was need to critique the 
case of Barnard. This is a very important case which addresses virtually every aspect of 
affirmative action. The chapter was made in the form of a case note which criticises 
whether and how the CC has put to rest questions that created confusion in the lower 
courts pertaining to affirmative action. 
 
Recommendations were proposed in chapter five of the study. The recommendations 
centred on what could be done to make affirmative action effective as well as to guard 
against the improper implementation of the policy. The recommendation drew mostly 
from the errors of lower courts as well as employers’ mistakes in interpreting the policy. 
If these recommendations are carried out, the success of affirmative action would be 
bolstered, the legality of the policy would be kept in check and there would be a better 
understanding and acceptance of affirmative action measures by all interested parties.  
 
In essence, the study has demonstrated that there is need for proper administration of 
the policy of affirmative action. The policy was promulgated for the benefit of all classes 
of people who were prejudiced by apartheid. The establishment of hierarchies amongst 
the designated group itself has no legal basis. It is from this development that the study 
emphasised the need to adhere to the principles of administrative justice and legality. It 
has been argued that if too much is left to the discretion of individuals, arbitrariness and 
unlawfulness is likely to reign. The selection of beneficiaries of affirmative action ought 
to be in accordance with demonstrable need and disparity in representivity. It is for this 
reason that the law demands that there be an equity plan before affirmative action can 
be implemented.  
 
The law is clear on how affirmative action ought to be implemented. It has been 
promulgated with sound reasoning and all fairness. If carried out properly, affirmative 
action will contribute to the attainment of an egalitarian society. An egalitarian state in 
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the context of labour law does not refer to an equal distribution of resources but rather 
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